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PROBABLE CAUSE REVISITED: SOME
DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS
EMANATING FROM ILLINOIS v.
GATES
EDWARD

I.

G.

MASCOLO·

INTRODUCTION

In Illinois v. Gates,) a sharply divided Supreme Court articu
lated a new, more flexible standard for evaluating the facial suffi
ciency of supporting affidavits for warrants based on hearsay
evidence contained in informant's tips. In doing so, the Court re
jected a rigid application of the two-pronged test established inAgui
lor v. Texas 2 and Spinelli v. United States,3 replacing it with a
totality-of-the-circumstances approach that placed strong emphasis
upon a practical and commonsense assessment of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. 4
It is the thesis of this article that the result reached in Gates,
and, in particular, the underlying theme implicit in the Court's ra
tionale, constitutes, collectively, a wholesale assault upon the contin
ued vitality of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution. s Further, it is the contention of this study that in es
pousing the cause of common sense and effective law enforcement,
the Court in Gates embarked upon a course that can result only in a
• Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-73; current member of the CONNECTICUT BAR
JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown Univer
sity, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
2. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
3. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2332; see United States v. Kolodziej, 712 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir.
1983)(per curiam).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thingg
to be seized.
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diminished role for judicial officers in making determinations of
probable cause; in a reduction of the independence and integrity of
the magistrates in the warrant process, and in a lowered standard of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants under the fourth amend
ment. The net result will be an evisceration of the core value of
human dignity and personal liberty secured by the amendment.
This article will first review the function served by probable
cause in protecting the individual's security and privacy from arbi
trary intrusions by government agents, and the crucial role per
formed by an independent judiciary in preserving the standard of
probable cause. An examination of the reasoned concern on the
Supreme Court for the continued vitality of an independent judici
ary that led to the establishment of the Agui/ar-Spinelli rules will also
be reviewed in the context of their purpose: to guide magistrates in
making proper determinations of probable cause in cases involving
hearsay reports of criminal activity received by the police from infor
mants. This examina~ion will reveal, however, that the two-pronged
test articulated by Agui/ar-Spinelli-to implement the general consti
tutional requirement that probable cause determinations are to be
made by neutral and detached magistrates, and not by law enforce
ment officers-was being applied in an overly-technical manner by
certain courts. This insistence upon rigid application of the Agui/ar
Spinelli rules laid the ideological groundwork for the decision in
Gates.
The Gates decision and the separate and concurring opinions
registered by four members of the Court will be reviewed in detail.
An analysis and critique of the position adopted by the majority in
Gates will demonstrate that the majority position will lead to a dis
mantlement of the "warrant machinery contemplated by the [flourth
[a]mendment."6 This article concludes with a call to the states to re
ject, under the authority of their own constitutions, the suggestion
("invitation" may be a more accurate term) implicit in Gates to dras
tically reduce the security of the individual from arbitrary and un
warranted intrusions upon his privacy by government agents.
Although this article discusses the past, it is not about the past.
Rather, it is about the present, and a portent of what lies ahead for
fourth amendment jurisprudence. It does not end on a pessimistic
note, however, but rather in a firm belief that the decision in Gates
will afford the states an opportunity to reassert the continued vitality
6.

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
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of personal security from unreasonable searches and seizures under
state law.
II.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY

The genius of the American constitutional scheme lies in its sep
aration of powers and its concomitant insistence upon an independ
ent judiciary. The role ofthe judiciary has been to guard against the
excesses of the coordinate branches of government by preserving the
supremacy of the Constitution through the rule of law and the judi
ciary's power to invalidate any executive or legislative act in conflict
with the fundamental law of the land. 7 The need for judicial inde
pendence has particular relevance to the dictates of the fourth
amendment, and to the protections that it secures. 8
Lying at the "core" of fourth amendment interests is the secur
ity of an individual's privacy against unwarranted intrusions by of
ficers of the state. 9 Because of the fundamental nature of this
guarantee, it has been characterized as being "basic" to a free and
democratic society.lO
The fourth amendment operates as a limitation upon the official
exercise of power I I by erecting a "constitutional barrier" between
citizen and government. 12 By imposing a standard of reasonable
ness 13 upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officers,
7. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-09 (1974); United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 & n.20, 462 (1965); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1943); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch ) 137, 163,
173-80 (1803); I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORlGlN AND MEANING 8-10 (1965);
G. DU;TZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT
171-75 & n.191 (1960); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491-92 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.
1961); Id. No. 81, at 506-07; T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 123-24
(1832); see also J. Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies (1660-1776) 196
97,296-97 (1951) (unpublished manuscript) (available in Harvard University Archives,
Pusey Library) (real significance of the opposition to executive abuses associated with the
writs of assistance was the constitutional stand taken by the American colonists: that acts
of Parliament in violation of the natural and the common law were void, and that it was
the office of the judiciary to invalidate them).
8. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948).
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); accord, Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
10. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
II. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); see United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 28-29
(1968); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amentment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353,
400 (1974).
12. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455 (1948).
13. The touchstone of fourth amendment analysis is the reasonableness, in the
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the amendment preserves privacy interests of individuals against ar
bitrary interference by the state. 14 The standard of reasonableness
requires that the facts relied upon to justify an intrusion "be capable
of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be
probable cause or a less stringent test."15 Similarly, a determination
of probable cause must be based on "objective facts" that justify the
issuance of a warrant by a magistrate, and "not merely on the sub
jective good faith of the police" .16 This ensures that an individual's
security and privacy interests are not subject to the discretionary
mercy of law enforcement officials.17
A critical component of the reasonableness standard is the re
quirement of probable cause. IS The central importance of requiring
light of the surrounding circumstances, of the particular governmental intrusion of an
individual's privacy and security. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481 (1983);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968). Reasonableness, in
the setting of police activity subject to fourth amendment strictures, will be determined
on the basis of a balance between the public interest in effective law enforcement and the
individual's right to be secure from arbitrary interference by government agents. See
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573,2579 (1983); Mimms, 434 U.S. at
109;-United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21;
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967).
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653-54 (1979); see United States v. Menden
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (plurality opinion); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307,312 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
One commentator, however, has argued that the fourth amendment was less a re
sponse to privacy concerns than it was a harbinger of equal protection values. The thesis
here is that the framers were concerned that law enforcement officers would discriminate
between the privileged and the poor in determining whose lives and homes would be
disrupted in ferreting out crime. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode ofJudi
cial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 481-82 (1978).
IS. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,654 (1979); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21
22 (1968).
16. Unites States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982); see Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925); Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923).
17. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967); Aguilar, 278 U.S. at 1I0-11.
18. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-16 (1979) (warrantless full-scale
arrests constitutionally unreasonable unless supported by probable cause); United States
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (a warrant may issue only upon probable cause);
United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (lith Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("search warrant
must be supported by probable cause"); United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1982) (to comply with constitutional precepts, search warrants must be based on
probable cause); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 129 (1937); see also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. I, 20 (1968) (dictum) ("If this case involved police conduct subject to the
[wlarrant [cllause of the [f]ourth [almendment, we would have to ascertain whether
'probable cause' existed to justify the search and seizure which took place"); if. Florida
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probable cause for reasonable searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment is to safeguard the privacy concerns of citizens from ar
bitrary intrusions by the police. 19 It is "the standard by which pri
vacy is reasonably invaded,"20 for it establishes the criteria for
testing a particular decision to search or seize against the constitu
tional precept of reasonableness. 21
At the same time, the criteria established for the existence of
probable cause seek to accommodate the competing interests of soci
ety in effective law enforcement. Thus, probable cause has served as
an effective compromise for accommodating the often opposing in
terests of the individual and society.22 This standard has embodied
"the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the min
imum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved
in [search-and-seizure activity] 'reasonable' under the [flourth
[a]mendment."23 To require more would unduly hamper effective
law enforcement, while sanctioning less would subject the privacy
interests of the individual to the capricious mercy of government
agents. 24
As this analysis has demonstrated, the existence of probable
cause is crucial to the vitality of the fourth amendment. But, the
requirement that such cause satisfy the concept of resonableness
under the amendment would be an empty gesture if the determina
tion were left to the subjective good faith of law enforcement officers.
It is in this particular setting that "the warrant machinery contem
v. Royer, 103 S. Ct 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion) (full-scale arrests and full-blown
searches on suspicion are violative of the fourth amendment).
19. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 213 (1979); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The requirement of probable cause for reasonable
searches and seizures is specifically mandated by the warrant clause of the fourth amend
ment, which established "the root principle of judicial superintendence of searches and
seizures." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 n.6 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Mascolo, Specificity Requirementsfor Warrants Under The Fourth Amendment:
Defining the Zone ofPrivacy, 73 DICK. L. REV. 1,6 (1968); see N. LASSON, supra note 18,
at 120.
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). For an analysis of the
''working relationship" between probable cause and the requirement of specificity for
warrants, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 5-7.
22. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949»; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,112 (1975) (standard of
probable cause "represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to
liberty and the [s)tate's duty to control crime").
23. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
24. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); Aguilar, 378 U.S. at IIO-ll; McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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plated by the [f]ourth [a]mendment"2S takes on added significance.
The general command of fourth amendment jurisprudence is
the requirement of a warrant. 26 The insistence upon the presence of
a warrant acknowledges the significant role played by the judicial
warrant in the constitutional scheme of protecting the individual
from arbitrary governmental intrusions upon his security and pri
vacy.27 In the first place, the requirement of a warrant provides the
detached scrutiny of an impartial magistrate to make the all-impor
tant determination of probable cause. It entrusts to a judicial officer
the task of assessing the quantum of evidence that will justify a
breach of an individual's zone ofprivacy.28 Ferreting out crime was
deemed too competitive an enterprise to qualify zealous law enforce
ment officers for the degree of detachment and objectivity required
for reasonable assessments of probable cause. As a result, the fourth
amendment interposes a magistrate between the citizen and the po
lice, in the belief that an objective mind might better determine the
need to invade the individual's security and privacy in order to en
force the law. 29 Thus, a determination of probable cause must be
based on "objective facts" that justify the issuance of a warrant by a
magistrate,
and "not merely on the subjective good faith" of govem
.='
ment agents. 30
The second purpose served by the warrant requirement is that it
defines and limits the scope of intrusion that law enforcement of
25. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
26. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (subject only to "a
few" exceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable).
27. See United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 845-46 (lith Cir. 1982).
28. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977); United States v. Martinez
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976)(a crucial purpose of the warrant requirement is the
substitution of the judgment of an impartial magistrate for that of the police); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (requirement that a warrant be obtained is a
requirement that the inferences to support a search or seizure be drawn by an impartial
judicial officer and not by zealous law enforcement officers); J. HALL, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 6:4, at 182-83 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
29. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2351-52, 2355, 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Agui
lor, 378 U.S. at 110-15 (A contrary rule would leave the security of individual privacy at
the discretionary mercy of police officers, and would undermine the independence of the
magistrate.); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (right of privacy
deemed too precious to be entrusted to the discretion of law officers); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)
(protection against unlawful searches more likely to be obtained by resort to search war
rants than by reliance upon the "sagacity of petty officers" acting under the "excitement"
attendant upon the capture of persons accused of crime); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 6:3, at
178-79.
30. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982).
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ficers are permitted to make, thereby increasing the probability that
a particular search or seizure, once commenced, will not exceed the
bounds of reasonableness. 31 Finally, the presence of a warrant as
sures the individual, whose security and privacy have been invaded,
of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to intrude
upon the individual's security and privacy, and the limits of his
power to do SO.32
The right not to be searched or seized without a neutral decision
that probable cause exists is basic to a free and enlightened society.
This guarantee, by removing from the discretion of law officers the
determination as to what evidence justifies an invasion of the indi
vidual's privacy, and entrusting it to a judicial officer,33 seeks to im
plement the prime aim and purpose of the fourth amendment:
personal security from unreasonable governmental intrusions upon
the privacy of the individual,34 Thus, the framers of the fourth
amendment placed their trust in the neutral magistrate, who, by ju
dicious use of the warrant power, would endeavor to strike the
proper balance between the privacy interests of the individual and
the concerns of society for effective law enforcement. 35 But, this
trust implicitly rejected any acquiescent or secondary role for the
magistrate. To the contrary, his role was to be central to the issuance
of warrants, .and would not allow for unquestioning or rubber
stamped deference to the judgment of police officers. 36 This meant,
at a minimum, that the magistrate would insist upon a substantial
basis for a judicial determination that probable cause existed. 37
Mere conc1usory allegations of wrongdoing, as the Supreme Court
has observed, are not sufficient. 38
InNathanson v. United States ,39 the Supreme Court held for the
first time that a warrant that is issued on the basis of a supporting
affidavit, that shows no facts upon which to base a finding of prob
31.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977).

32. Jd.; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
33. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 47 (1966); N. LASSON, supra note 18, at
120.

34. See United States v. Poller,43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); T.
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 68 (1969).
35. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 47.
36. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 6:5, at 183.
37. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
38. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971); United States v. Ven
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965) (dictum).
39. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
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able cause, is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 40 The
Court reasoned that since a valid warrant must be supported by
probable cause, this standard could be satisfied only if a judicial of
ficer found such cause from the "facts or circumstances presented to
him under oath or affirmation."41
The Nathanson Court distinguished Locke v. United States ,42
upon which the government relied, by noting that Locke was a pro
ceeding to forfeit a cargo of goods seized for violation of the revenue
laws. "It presented," the Court observed, "no question concerning
the validity of a warrant."43 Moreover, the government could take
nothing from the fact that the Locke search involved the seizure of
goods smuggled into the country in fraud of the revenue laws. While
the practice of sanctioning searches for such contraband on the basis
of affidavits of suspicion or belief has "been sustained from the earli
est times," the search in Nathanson was of a private residence. 44 In
the judgment of the Court, there was "nothing in [the revenue] stat
utes [governing smuggled goods that] indicate[d] that a warrant to
search a private dwelling [might] rest upon mere affirmance of suspi
cion or belief without disclosure of supporting facts or
circumstances."45
Nathanson, then, stands for the principle that mere conclusory
allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to show or establish prob
able cause.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Nathanson principle in Gior
denello v. United States. 46 The Court was confronted, once again,
with a mere conclusory affidavit, in the form of a written complaint,
under oath, for an arrest warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 47
The Court concluded that the complaint did "not pass [constitu
tional] muster," because it did not provide any basis for a judicial
determination that probable cause existed. 48 The Court reasoned
that fourth amendment principles governed applications for arrest
warrants, as well as for search warrants, and that those principles
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 47.
Id.
II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
290 U.S. at 47.
Id.
Id.
357 U.S. 480 (1958).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 4.
357 U.S. at 486.
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required that probable cause determinations be made by independ
ent judicial officers.49 Simply put, it was not the function of the
magistrate to accept "without question" mere conclusory statements
by law officers of criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the Court thought
that the magistrate "must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the
facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause."50
Applying these criteria to the complaint at hand, the Giordenello
Court found the complaint to be clearly deficient. It contained no
"affirmative allegation" that the affiant had personal knowledge of
the information given. 51 Nor did the complaint "indicate any
sources for the complainant's belief' of criminal activity. Finally,
the complaint failed to "set forth any other sufficient basis upon
which a finding of probable cause could be made."52
The Court observed that it was difficult to understand how a
judicial officer could independently assess the probability of crimi
nal activity on the part of the defendant. 53 Indeed, concluded the
Court, if such a complaint were upheld, the substantive protections
surrounding the issuance of warrants would be seriously compro
mised, and the complaint process would be "of only formal signifi
cance, entitled to perfunctory approval" by a magistrate. 54 This, in
the Court's opinion, ''would not comport with the protective pur
poses which a complaint [or a supporting affidavit] is designed to
achieve."s5
Certain principles emerge from Nathanson and Giordenello.
First, and foremost, is the independence and the integrity required of
the reviewing magistrate. His role is both crucial and fundamental
to the warrant process. Not only must he not passively defer to the
subjective requests of law officers, but also he should not sanction
any attempt from any source to usurp the functions of his office. If
the commands of the fourth amendment are to have any meaning,
then, clearly, an independent and viably functional judiciary must
be interposed between the police and the citizenry. To do otherwise
would reduce probable cause determinations to subjective assess
ments colored by the competitive zeal of law enforcement officers. 56
49. Id. at 485-86.
50. Id at 486.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 486-87.
54. Id. at 487.
55. Id.
56. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
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This, in tum, would lead to a reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the individual; for, if an individual is protected in the knowl
edge that his privacy interests are only as secure as the police desire
them to be, then that individual is protected in name only. The Con
stitution was intended to be more than mere words, and was never
intended to convey empty promises. Thus, an independent judiciary
secures for the individual both the procedural and the substantive
guarantees of the Constitution. This, in substance, is the cardinal
tenet of Nathanson-Giordenello.
Closely allied to this is the second command of Nathanson-Gior
denello. If an independent judiciary is to discharge its role of objec
tively determining when the privacy interests of the individual are to
be subordinated to the effective enforcement of the criminal laws,
then the judiciary must be provided with a substantial factual basis
upon which to predicate its decision. It is here that the role of prob
able cause is crucial to the warrant process, for it is "the standard by
which privacy is reasonably invaded."57 Probable cause cannot be
based on mere conclusions, suppositions, or suspicions. As is true of
other constitutional protections, the standard of probable cause is
one of substance and meaning. This standard was not satisfied by the
"bare bones" affidavits contained in Nathanson and Giordenello.
Consequently, the magistrate was prevented from truly discharging
his constitutional role of objectively determining whether there was
sufficient cause to justify a reasonable intrusion upon the individ
ual's privacy interests.
Aguilar-Spinelli represented a serious effort by the Supreme
Court to implement the commands of Nathanson and Giordenello, by
requiring law officers to provide certain information to magistrates,
and by structuring probable cause inquiries in a manner that would
assure the independence of the judiciary as well as ensure a greater
degree of accuracy in probable cause determinations. The focal
point of inquiry inAguilar-Spinelli was the troublesome area of hear
say evidence contained in tips received by the police from
informants.

56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Leftowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
57. Mascolo, supra note 20, at 6 (emphasis added).
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III. AGUILAR-SPINELLI
A.

Aguilar v, Texas

InAguilar v. Texas,58 the Supreme Court was required to assess
the constitutional sufficiency of a supporting affidavit for a search
warrant that, in relevant part, recited that the affiants "received relia
ble information from a credible person and do believe that. . . nar
cotics. . . are being [illegally] kept at the above described premises
"59

The Court began its discussion with a reaffirmation of the prin
ciple that searches conducted under the authority of a warrant" 'are
to be preferred over the hurried action' " and discretionary judgment
of law enforcement officers. 60 A contrary rule would reduce the
fourth amendment" 'to a nullity,' "61 compromise the security inter
ests of the individual against unreasonable searches,62 and discour
age resort to warrants. 63 Thus, when a search is conducted under the
authority of a warrant, a "reviewing court[] will accept evidence of a
less Judicially competent or persuasive character than would have
justified an officer in acting. . .without a warrant'. . . and will sus
tain the judicial determination [of probable cause provided] 'there
was [a] substantial basis for [the magistrate] to [have] conc1ud[ed]' "
that probable cause existed. 64
The Court then sounded a cautionary note that, while a review
ing court would pay "substantial deference to judicial determina
tions of probable cause," the magistrate would still be required to
"perform his 'neutral and detached' function and [should] not serve
merely as a rubber stamp for the police."65
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court con
cluded that the affidavit under review was constitutionally deficient
and suffered from the same conclusory vice that had infected the
58.

378 U.S. 108 (1964).

59. Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 1I0-ll (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932».
378 U.S. at III (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948».
if. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)
(security against illegal searches "more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants
than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers").
63. 378 U.S. at III; if. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960) (if a peace
officer had to present evidence "of a more judicially competent or persuasive character"
to obtain a warrant than would have justified his "acting on his own without a warrant,"
resort to warrants "would ultimately be discouraged").
64. 378 U.S. at III (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960».
61.

62. See 378 U.S. at Ill;

65. Id.
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affidavits in Nathanson and Giordenello. 66 The mere affirmance of
belief that the defendant possessed narcotics was not the belief of the
affiants themselves; it was that of an unidentified informant. 67
Moreover, the affidavit contained" 'no affirmative allegation that
the affiant[s] [had] personal knowledge of the matters contained
therein.' "68 In fact, noted the Court, the affidavit did not even con
tain an affirmative claim or allegation that the unidentified inform
ant had such knowledge. 69 "For all that appears," commented the
Court, the informant "merely suspected, believed or concluded" that
the defendant had narcotics in his possession. 70 This was simply an
inadequate basis upon which the reviewing magistrate could be ex
pected to assess independently the existence of probable cause.
Hence, "he [must have] necessarily accepted 'without question' the
informant's... 'mere conclusion.' "71
To guard against such deficiencies, and to prevent their reoccur
rence, the Court held that a reviewing magistrate "must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded" that evidence subject to seizure was where he said it was,
and "some of the underlying circumstances" from which the affiant
concluded that the informant "was 'credible' or his information 'reli
able.'''72 Otherwise, the Court feared, "'the inferences from the
facts which lead to the complaint' " will be drawn, not by the neutral
and detached magistrate as required by the Constitution, but, rather,
by police officers "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,' " or worse, by informants. 73
The Court, in Aguilar, thus established a two-pronged test to
implement the constitutional requirement that probable cause deter
minations be made by neutral and detached magistrates, and not by
law enforcement officers,74 and to assess the legal sufficiency, pursu
ant to the standard of probable cause, of an informant's tip. These
prongs have come to be known, respectively, as the "basis-of-knowl
66. Id. at Il2-15.
67. Id. at lB.
68. Id. (quoting Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486).
69. Id. at 113; see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486.
70. 378 U.S. at 113-14.
71. Id. at 114; see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486-87.
72. 378 U.S. at 114 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486; and Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948».
74. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16.
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edge" prong and the "veracity" prong. 75
The basis-of-knowledge prong, on the one hand, requires that
the supporting affidavit disclose the underlying circumstances from
which the informer drew his conclusion of criminal wrongdoing so
as to permit an objective evaluation by an independent judicial of
ficer.76 The veracity prong, on the other hand, requires that the reli
ability of the informant be shown or established. 77
As to the basis-of-knowledge prong, an affidavit based on an
informant's tip or report, standing alone, will not provide probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant, unless the tip includes
information that apprises the reviewing magistrate of the informer's
basis for concluding that the evidence subject to seizure is where he
claims it is.78 A statement from the informant that he personally
observed the criminal activity in question would be sufficient or, if
the informant came by his information indirectly, and provided a
satisfactory explanation as to why his sources were reliable, then the
prong would be satisfied. 79 In the absence of a statement detailing
the circumstances in which the information had been obtained or
gathered, the basis-of-knowledge prong may nevertheless be satisfied
by a detailed description of the defendant's criminal activity from
which the magistrate may reasonably infer that the informer was re
lying upon something more substantial than a casual rumor or an
individual's general reputation. 80
The veracity prong requires that the affiant inform the magis
75. E.g., United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 39-40 (5th
417 U.S. 908 (1974).
76. Id.

Cu.

1973), cerl. denied,

77. Id.
78. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 412-13,416; United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449,452 (3d Cu. 1982).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see United
States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cu. 1982).
80. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 416-17; United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cu. 1974);
United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 40-41 (5th Cu. 1973), cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974).
It has been argued that independent corroboration should not be considered by a
magistrate in applying the basis-of-knowledge prong, because while corroboration may
indicate an informant's truthfulness, it will not establish that his knowledge has been
obtained in a reliable way. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 531-33, 313 A.2d 847, 861
62, cerl. denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974); Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for
Search or Arresl, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 963 n.30 (1969). But, surely, corroboration,
where shown in substantial detail suggestive of inside information, should be sufficient to
permit a magistrate to reasonably infer both veracity and reliability. See Gales, 103 S.
Ct. at 2349 n.22 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
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trate of his basis for concluding or believing that the informant is
credible, or that the informant's information is reliable. 8l The relia
bility of the tip may be verified by independent corroboration,82 or
independent investigation. 83 Such verification tends to dispel any
notion that an informer's report has been fabricated. 84
The veracity prong may also be satisfied by a recitation in the
affidavit that the informant previously supplied accurate information
to the authorities. 8s Alternatively, it may be satisfied by proof that
the tip contains information against the informant's penal interest. 86
Under the Aguilar equation, probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant may be based exclusively upon an informer's tip or report
only if both the informant's basis of knowledge and his credibility
are specified in the supporting affidavit.87
B.

Spinelli v. United States

The Aguilar standards were refined and explicated in Spinelli v.
United States ,88 which involved a somewhat detailed affidavit con
taining both a tip from an anonymous informant and a report of an
independent FBI investigation which partially corroborated the tip.
The information imparted in the tip, however, was largely innocu
ous, thereby making the informer's report a crucial element in the
81. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 412-13, 416; United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449,452 (3d Cir. 1982).
82. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276,
1284 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (5th Cir.
1974).
83. United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1063 (1977); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
84. See United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Zucco, 694 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449,
453 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Swan, 545 F. Supp. 799, 807 (D. Del. 1982); see
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 66
(2d Cir. 1983).
86. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); United
States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.
1983)(dictum); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
87. United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Bush,647 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir.
1974), cerl. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 587-88
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973),
cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (affidavit must contain "sufficient objective assertions
from which a detached magistrate may reasonably conclude that the hearsay should be
credited").
88. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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probable cause equation. 89
Because a magistrate reviewing a Spinelli-type affidavit would
have to assess the probative value of the tip in conjunction with the
independent law enforcement investigation, the Supreme Court first
measured the informer's tip against the Aguilar standards,90 and
found that the report received from the informant failed both prongs
of Aguilar .91 .
The first standard was not satisfied because there was no show
ing of the informant's basis of knowledge. There was no way to de
termine how the FBI's source had received his information 
whether through direct observation or personal involvement in the
defendant's bookmaking venture. Moreover, if the informer had
come by the information indirectly, there was no explanation for
why his own sources of information were reliable.92
The Spinelli Court did recognize that, in the absence of a state
ment detailing the manner in which the information had been gath
ered, the basis-of-knowledge requirement could be satisfied by the
detail of the informant's tip.93 But here, the Court cautioned, "it
[was] especially important that the tip describe the ... criminal ac
tivity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is rely
ing on something more substantial than a casual rumor . . . or an
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."94
Thus, a magistrate, when presented with sufficient detail, will be able
to reasonably infer that the informant had obtained his information
in a reliable way.95
The Court did not believe, however, that such an inference
could be made "in the present case."96 The "only facts supplied"
were that the defendant was using two specified telephones, and that
these telephones were being employed in gambling operations. To
the Court, "[t]his meager report could easily have been obtained
from an ofiband remark heard at a neighborhood bar."97
The Court also found that Aguilar's veracity prong had not
been satisfied. Although the affiant had sworn that his source was
89. See id. at 414-15.
90. Id. at 415-16.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 416.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 417; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1979).
96. 393 U.S. at 417.
97. Id.
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" 'reliable' ", he offered the magistrate no supporting basis for this
conclusion. 98
The Spinelli analysis supplemented the Aguilar requirements by
addressing the question of whether the FBI's independent investiga
tive efforts had been sufficiently successful to establish the inform
ant's reliability. In so doing, the Court observed that a magistrate's
constitutional responsibilities require that he rely on something more
than an informant's report which fails, even when partially corrobo
rated, to measure up to the Aguilar standards. Such a report is not as
reliable as one which would satisfy theAguilar tests standing alone. 99
When it considered the allegations detailing the FBI's in
dependent investigative efforts, the Court believed that "the patent
doubts" that Aguilar raised concerning the tip's reliability had not
been "adequately resolved."loo "At most," the Court observed, the
allegations indicated only that the defendant could have used the
telephones specified by the informer "for some purpose."101 But
this, by itself, was siplply insufficient to support both the inference
that the informant was "generally trustworthy" and that he had
made his accusation on the basis of information obtained in a relia
ble way.J02 More would be required to show that the informer "had
not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth" and that the in
formation was of the sort which "in common experience may be rec
ognized as having been obtained in a reliable way."103
The Court, in Spinelli, thus concluded that the tip, even when
partially corroborated, was insufficient to provide the basis for a
finding of probable cause. 104 This did not mean, however, that the
tip could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determina
tion. "Rather, it needed some further support."J05 This support, the
Court believed, was lacking in the corroboration that was provided
to the magistrate. In short, the Court could find "nothing alleged
which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's
report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being
committed."I06 To the contrary, the corroboration was of some "in
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 416.
Id. at 415-16; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
393 U.S. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418.
Id.
Id.
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nocent-seeming activity and data,"107 not criminal conduct, and
thus failed to demonstrate reliability. lOS
In concluding that the affidavit did not measure up to the Agui
lar standards, the Court observed that it could not "sustain this war
rant without diluting important safeguards that assure that the
judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself be
tween the police and the citizenry."I09
Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, was "inclined to agree
with the majority" that there are "limited special circumstances in
which an 'honest' informant's report, if sufficiently detailed, will in
effect verify itself," so as to permit a reviewing magistrate to reason
ably infer that the information had been obtained in a reliable
way.110 But even when this is not the case, the tip can be sustained if
it is supplemented by sufficient corroboration. Thus, to Justice
White, verification of an informant's report "relates to the reliability
of the source: because an informer is right about some things, he is
more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified
facts."lll
The Spinelli elaboration and refinement of the Aguilar tests pro
vided that if an informant's report or tip failed under either or both
of the two Aguilar prongs, probable cause could still be established
by independent police investigatory work if it corroborated the tip to
such an extent that it supported "both the inference that the informer
107. Id. at 414.
108. See id. at 417-19.
109. Id. at 419 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 425 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
111. Id. at 427.
In his opinion concurring in the judgement in Gales, Justice White amplified upon
his Spinelli concurrence by correcting Justice Brennan's interpretation, contained in the
latter's dissent in Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2354-55, of the Spinelli concurrence as "espousing
the view that 'corroboration of certain details in a tip may be sufficient to satisfy the
veracity, but not the basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar.''' Justice White denied this,
stating:
I did not say that corroboration could never satisfy the basis of knowledge
prong. My concern was, and still is, that the prong might be deemed satisfied
on the basis of corroboration of information that does not in any way suggest
that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge for his report. If, how
ever,. . .the police corroborat[ed) information from which it [could) be inferred
that the informant's tip was grounded on inside information, this corroboration
[would be) sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. . . .The rules
would indeed be strange if, as Justice Brennan suggest[ed) [in his Gales dissent,
103 S. Ct. at 2356,) the basis of knowledge prong could be satisfied by detail in
the tip alone, but not by independent police work.
Id. at 2349 n.22 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge. . . on
the basis of information obtained in a reliable way."112 In addition,
a sufficiently detailed tip may provide a proper foundation for a
magistrate to conclude that the informant based his allegations on
adequate or substantial knowledge, and not on mere rumor or suspi
cion. l13 In instances in which law enforcement officers rely upon
corroboration, the "ultimate question" will be whether the corrobo
rated tip is as trustworthy as a tip that would satisfy the Aguilar re
quirements without independent corroboration. I 14
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli tests, an officer who applies for a
warrant on the basis of an informant's tip or report must first show
either that the informer is credible or that his information is reliable.
Second, the applicant-affiant must set forth some of the facts upon
which the informant based his conclusion or allegations of criminal
activity. Finally, if the informant's tip fails to satisfy either or both of
these tests, probable cause may still be established by independent
police investigatory work that is sufficiently corroborative of the re
port to make up or cOmpensate for any deficiencies contained in the
report. I IS
C. A Certain Rigidity in Applying Aguilar-Spinelli

Although theAguilar-Spinelli rules enhanced the integrity of the
warrant process by preserving the independence and objectivity of
1l2. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (White, J., concurring in the judgment);
Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 4.-7.
113. See Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 416-17; United States v. Zucco, 694 F.2d 44, 47 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Swan, 545 F. Supp. 799, 807 (D. Del. 1982).
It has been argued, however, that since it is easy to fabricate even a wealth of detail,
a defect in the veracity prong cannot be rehabilitated by self-verifying detail. Stanley v.
State, 19 Md. App. 507, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862, cert. denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974); J. HALL,
supra note 28, § 5:20, at 163; Note, Probable Cause and the First-time Informer, 43 U.
COLO. L. REv. 357, 362 (1972). But see United States V. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)(suggesting that a wealth of detail may be sufficient to satisfy both
the basis test and the trustworthiness test).
According to one commentator, only corroboration of incriminating detail will suf
fice to permit an inference of reliability. Note, supra, at 362; see J. HALL, supra note 28,
§ 5:20, at 162-63.
114. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 415.
115. For further discussion of Aguilar-Spinelli, see J. HALL, supra note 28, at
§§ 5:17-25; I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND
MENT § 3.3 (1978 and Supps. 1983, 1984); LaFave, Probable Causefrom Informants: The
Effects ofMurphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. I; Moy
lan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV.
741 (1974); Note, supra note 113; Note, supra note 80.
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the magistrate,1l6 they did generate controversy and a certain confu
sion among the lower courts. This particularly arose from difficulties
in properly applying the basis-of-knowledge prong. The result was,
in the words of the Gates majority, "an excessively technical dissec
tion of informants' tips"117 that "reflect[ed] a rigid application of [the
Aguilar-Spinelli] rules."1l8
Because the Gates majority singled out three lower-court deci
sions 119 as being reflective of such "rigid application," these cases
warrant further attention as harbingers of the Gates decision.
In Bridger v. State, 120 the court invalidated an affidavit which
alleged that the defendant's apartment contained implements for the
purpose of aiding in the commission of the crime of robbery with
firearms. The basis for this information was a statement of McCall,
an accomplice of the defendant in the specific bank robbery who had
turned over to the officer-affiant $800.00 taken in the robbery. The
informant stated that the defendant had the gun, a .38 caliber re
volver, and two ski masks that had been used in the commission of
the offense. These items, the affiant alleged, were hidden in the
apartment. 121
The Bridger court concluded that the affidavit demonstrated
"no more than a suspicion on the part of the informer."122 The affi
davit was deficient, reasoned the court, because it did not relate the
basis of the informer's information, either by personal observation or
incriminating statements, and because it did not provide "any other
underlying facts or circumstances" that lent credence to the inform
ant's report. 123
116. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415; if. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 566 (1976) (one purpose of the warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of
an impartial magistrate for that of the police).
117. 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 2330 n.9.
119. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Gales, cited People v. Brethauer,
174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (en bane); People v. Palanza, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028,371
N.E.2d 687 (1978); and Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), as
appropriate examples of "rigid application" that had been "brought to our attention by
the [s]tate." 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9. Justice White also believed that Palanza and Bridger
were "excellent examples of overly-technical applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli stan
dard," and that the "holdings in these cases could easily be disapproved without reliance
on a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis." Id. at 2350 n.26 (White, J., concurring).
120. 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
121. Id. at 803.
122. Id.
123. Id.•
Personal observation by an informant of the facts contained in his tip will satisfy the
basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinel/i. See Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 416. It will also
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The analysis of the Bridger affidavit was too narrow and unreal
istic. 124 Viewed as a whole, the "total atmosphere"125 of the affida
vit, the full import of the statement by the informant, McCall, was
clearly against his penal interest, and carried its own indicia of credi
bility for purposes of supporting a finding of probable cause. 126 In
the first place, the statement established that the source of the infor
mation was an accomplice of the defendant in the commission of a
serious and violent felony - the armed robbery of a bank. Sec
ondly, the informant had already turned over to the affiant part of
the loot or criminal proceeds of his joint venture in crime with the
defendant. This, in itself, confirmed the accuracy of his admitted
involvement in the robbery, and lent credence to his claim that the
implements used to aid in the commission of the offense were in fact
hidden in the defendant's apartment. Furthermore, McCall de
scribed the weapon used in the robbery as a .38 caliber revolver, and
also described the two ski masks employed in the commission of the
offense. Who was better qualified to do this than a participant in the
crime?
As to the reliability of the basis of McCall's information, this
cou~d have been inferred readily and reasonably from the inform
ant's unique relationship with the defendant. Thus, it would have
been reasonable for the magistrate to have inferred that McCall had
personally observed the revolver and the ski masks in the apartment,
had witnessed their secretion in the apartment, or that the defendant
himself had imparted this information. Obviously, the weapon and
the masks were items of highly incriminating evidence, and it would
have been perfectly natural for McCall and the defendant to have
been concerned about their discovery by the police, and anxious to
provide a place for their safekeeping. 127
be sufficient to "establish the reliability of the evidence upon which the informer base[s)
his conclusions" of wrongdoing. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (if the constitutional
policy of according preference to searches and seizures under a warrant is to be served,
then affidavits for warrants "must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in
a commonsense and realistic fashion").
125. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
126. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion);
United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th
Cir. 1983) (dictum); see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[I)f, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the crime in
the nature of admission against interest, the affidavit giving this information should be
held sufficient.").
127. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (White, J., concurring in the judgment);

1983]

PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES

351

Granted that McCall was already in police custody and was un
doubtedly anxious to curry favor with the authorities by making the
best deal for himself. Nevertheless, these factors do not detract from
the aura of credibility surrounding a statement that was clearly
against McCall's penal interest. 128
The second case cited by the Gates majority as reflecting a
"rigid application" ofAguilar-Spinelli rules was People v. Palanza .129
The Palanza affidavit, submitted in support of an application for a
search warrant, stated that an informant of previous and demon
strated reliability had seen, on specifically described premises,
" 'within the past 72 hours,. . . a quantity of a white crystalline sub
stance which was represented to the informant by a white male occu
pant of the premises to be cocaine.' "130 Further, it was alleged that
the informer " 'has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in the
past,. . . is thoroughly familiar with its appearance[,]' " and "'that
the white crystalline powder he observed in the. . . premises ap
peared to him to be cocaine.' "13l
ThePalanza court, noting that no question had been raised con
cerning the reliability or credibility of the informant, 132 nevertheless
ruled that the warrant was defective, because there was "no indica
tion" as to how the informer, or any other person, could determine
whether a particular substance was in fact cocaine "and not some
other white substance such as sugar or salt."133 "Had the substance
been unique in appearance," the court acknowledged, "we believe
the complaint for a search warrant would have been sufficient."134 It
would have been sufficient, according to the Palanza court, "even
absent the uniqueness of the substance's appearance," had the in
formant identified the occupant of the premises, who had repre
sented the substance to be cocaine, to be one of the possessors of the
substance, thereby establishing, "an admission against penal
interests." 135
By subjecting the affidavit to a hypercritical assessment, the
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-18; United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl.
denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v. King, 564 F. Supp. 25, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
128. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion).
129. 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028,371 N.E.2d 687 (1978).
130. Id. at 1029, 371 N.E.2d at 688.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1030, 371 N.E.2d at 689.
134. Id. at 1031,371 N.E.2d at 689.
135. Id.
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Palanza court committed fundamental error. The court held that the
affidavit had not satisfied Aguilar's basis-of-knowledge test. Yet, the
affidavit had done just that. In formulating its two-pronged test in
Aguilar, the Supreme. Court mandated that "the magistrate must be
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the
informant [could conclude] that the narcotics were where he claimed
they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the
officer [could conclude] that the informant...was 'credible' or his
information 'reliable.' "136 The prosecution satisfied the basis-of
knowledge prong in Palanza by informing the magistrate, through
the personal observation of an experienCed informant, of ''the under
lying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were."137 Direct personal ob
servation by an informer of criminal activity satisfies the basis-of
knowledge prong,138 and is sufficient to establish the reliability of the
evidence upon which the informant based his conclusions of wrong
doing. 139 Furthermore, this direct personal observation was con
firmed by an occupant of the premises. Therefore, the affid~vit
clearly satisfied the basis-of-knowledge prong, and the court; in
Palanza, should have so held, rather than engage in an unwarranted
refuiement of the knowledge test. l40
136. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
137. Id.; see 55 Ill. App. 3d at 1029-30,371 N.E.2d at 688.
138. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.
139. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("al
leged direct personal observation of the informant [is] surely a sufficient basis upon
which to predicate a finding of reliability [of evidence] under any test").
140. See United States v. Cates, 663 F.2d 947,948 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980); United
States v. Shipstead, 433 F.2d 368, 372 (9th Cir. 1970).
As an example, among several others, of how an affiant may properly demonstrate
the basis of knowledge of his informant, the Palanza court quoted, with approval, one
commentator's observation that the informer "may be shown to know that the substance
was a narcotic substance by. . .'a use of a part of the substance by the informant fol
lowed by the effects to be expected if it is what the informant says it is.''' 55 Ill. App. 3d
at 1030-31, 371 N.E.2d at 689 (quoting LaFave, Probable Cause frdm Informants: The
Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1,39-40).
Such an unrealistic approach undoubtedly contributed to the demise of Aguilar
Spinelli in Gates. See Shipstead, 433 F.2d at 372 ("[t]he suggestion that a search warrant
affidavit must allege how the informant knew the drug was methamphetamine is hyper
critical and falls before the [United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)] admo
nitions. . .that such affidavits 'must be tested. . .in a common sense and realistic
fashion' and '[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity...have no proper place in
this area' "); accord, Cates, 663 F.2d at 948 (informant related personally observed facts;
"[i]t is not critical that he did not state how he lQlew that the contraband was a controlled
substance") (citations omitted); House, 604 F.2d at 1142 (an omission in the affidavit as
to how the informer identified the drugs is not "fatal" to a finding of probable cause).
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The third, and final, case cited by the Gates majority to illus
trate the "rigid application" of the Aguilar-Spinelli rules was People
v. Brethauer. 141 !nBrethauer, the Supreme Court of Colorado inval
idated a warrant that had been issued on the basis of an affidavit
This unrealistic approach ignored the fact that the standard of probable cause is " 'only
the probability, and not a prima facie showing,''' Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419); see Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348, or "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence," Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330, of
criminal activity.
Although it is true that the basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli may be
satisfied by an informant injecting himself with a part of the alleged narcotic substance,
followed by the effects to be expected from the injection of narcotics, Foxall v. State, 157
Ind. App. 19,24-25,298 N.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1973), it does not follow that this method of
proof sets "a minimum standard" by which all methods of satisfying the knowledge test
are 'to be measured. Hoskins v. State, 174 Ind. App. 475, 479, 367 N.E.2d 1388, 1390
(1977) (observing that were the rule otherwise, the affidavit in Foxall would itself have
. been deficient "because the informant did not state how he knew what a heroin reaction
was like"). Nor is it appropriate to argue, as one commentator has, that insistence upon
some showing that the informant knew that the substance he observed was, in fact, a
narcotic, is not hypercritical because such a showing of knowledge may be made in a
variety of ways. LaFave, supra note 115, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. at 39. The ease with which
the basis-of-knowledge requirement may be satisfied by a particular method in a particu
lar factual setting is not the issue. Rather, the issue is whether the standard of probable
cause has been satisfied by the particular method employed in that particular setting.
Resolution of this issue will depend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Here, both magistrates and reviewing courts should be guided by the Supreme Court's
admonition in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949):
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must
be proved.
Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
The Court has remained faithful to this command by insisting that affidavits for
warrants "must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense
and realistic fashion." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); see Gates,
103 S. Ct. at 2330-31, 2332. Such documents are "normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation," and "[t]echnical requirements of elaborate
specificity" would have "no proper place in this area." Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108; see
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. Furthermore, a "grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts toward warrants will tend to discourage [law enforcement officers] from submit
ting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting," Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108, which is
what the Supreme Court has encouraged them to do. See United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106-09; see also Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960). The short of it is, that if the police are to be encouraged to seek
warrants, they should not simultaneously be discouraged from doing so by rigid insis
tence upon hypertechnical assesments of probable cause. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108
09; Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
Similarly, they should not be restricted to any particular method, regardless of its degree
of reliability, of establishing the basis of knowledge of an informant's tip.
141. 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (en banc).
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containing an informant's tip. The affiant stated that he knew the
informant "'to be reliable, based on past information supplied by
the informer which has proved to be accurate.' "142 The informer
claimed that L.S.D. and marijuana were located on specified prem
ises, as well as in two motor vehicles, and the affiant alleged that the
informant had purchased, on two occasions, L.S.D. and S.T.P.
"'within the past five days.' "143 The affiant also stated that the
purchased capsules were delivered to the" 'Weld County Sheriffs
Office, [and] were tested and did contain L.S.D. and S.T.P.' "144
Further, that at the time of purchase, the informer saw other cap
sules containing L.S.D. and S.T.P., " 'and the party making the sale
said he had two ounces of marijuana.' "145 The seller also told the
informant that he was going to obtain one hundred additional cap
sules of L.S.D. and two kilograms of marijuana, " 'and offered to sell
to the informer one kilogram of marijuana.' "146 Finally, the in
formant, who " 'also saw instruments for use in smoking marijuana
on the premises, [is] to make the purchase today.' "147
The court found the affidavit to be "fatally defective" under
both prongs of Aguilar-Spinel/i, as the reliability of the informant
was never established, nor was any basis set forth to show the source
of his information. 148 Furthermore, the court reasoned, while the
affidavit referred to three locations, namely, two motor vehicles and
a house, there was nothing in the affidavit which indicated how the
informer had concluded that the drugs were present in the house, or
that there existed a connection between the defendants and the
house or the vehicles. 149 In addition, the affidavit did not show
whether the information obtained by the informant was through his
own observations or from another person. Nor did the affidavit con
tain a statement "as to whether" the "alleged" purchases had taken
place on the premises or had involved persons who were "in any
way" related to or associated with the premises. 150 Finally, the
court concluded, nothing appeared in the affidavit to establish
whether the capsules and marijuana had been observed by the in
former or by someone else, or to establish where the" 'instruments' "
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 34, 482 P.2d at 371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34-35, 482 P.2d at 371.
Id. at 35, 482 P.2d at 371.
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had been observed.l5l
Justice Hodges, dissenting, correctly complained that the major
ity was requiring "supertechnical drafting of affidavits," and had
failed to perceive from the affidavit the connection between "the de
scribed [drug] transactions [and] the described premises." 152 But, ar
gued Justice Hodges, "the affidavit describes that the informant
[had] stated that there [were] L.S.D. and S.T.P. capsules and mari
juana at the premises; that the informant [had] made purchases of
the same; and [that] the informant also saw instruments for use in
smoking marijuana on the premises." 153 Moreover, the first sentence
of the affidavit specifically stated the address of the premises. Thus,
he interpreted the majority opinion as apparently requiring every
clause of the affidavit to be followed by a specific reference to the
address of the premises. 154
Decisions such as Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger place law en
forcement officers between a rock and a hard place. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court has admonished them to seek warrants
wherever reasonably feasible. 155 Accordingly, to encourage the
practice of seeking warrants, the Court has expressed a preference
for searches and seizures conducted under the authority of a warrant
by noting that, in doubtful or marginal cases, a search or seizure
under a warrant may be sustained where, without one, it would be
invalidated. 156 On the other hand, if affidavits for search warrants
are not tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts "in a com
monsense and realistic fashion," but rather, are subjected to
"[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity," as reflected in a
"grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war
rants," police officers will be reluctant to submit this evidence of
wrongdoing to prior judicial scrutiny. 157 This is precisely the vice of
151. Id.
152. Id. at 42, 482 P.2d at 375 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (subject only to "a few" excep
tions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 106-09 (1965) (strongly supporting preference to be accorded to searches under a
warrant).
156. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (arrest warrant); Ven
tresca, 380 U.S. at 106-09 (search warrant); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
270-71 (1960) (in doubtful cases, where there is lacking "clearly convincing evidence"
justifying immediate need to search, it is "most important that resort be had to a war
rant," so that determinations of probable cause can be made by "an independent judicial
officer").
157. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108; United States v. Shipstead, 433 F.2d 368, 372 (9th
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the decisions in Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger. By subjecting the
basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli to a hypercritical as
sessment of probable cause, the courts in these cases effectively dis
couraged the police from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer prior to acting.
Constitutional rules and principles were established to guaran
tee fundamental rights, not to encourage the facilitation of crime.
The net result of applying theAgui/ar-Spinelli rules in an excessively
technical and unrealistic fashion has been to breed disrespect for the
lofty ideals the Supreme Court sought to implement by fashioning
the rules, and to thwart the Court's attempts to encourage the police
to submit their evidence of crime to prior judicial scrutiny.
And so, the stage was set for Gates.
IV.

ILLINOIS V. GATES

In Illinois v. Gates,158 the Supreme Court "squarely addressed,"
for the first time, the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards to
tips from anonymous informants. 159 At issue was the constitutional
sufficiency of an anonymous, but partially corroborated, message re
ceived by the police. 160
Bloomingdale, Illinois, is a suburb of Chicago, and is located in
Du Page County. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Depart
ment received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which
stated that the defendants, Lance and Susan Gates, were residents of
" 'your town [who] strictly make their living on selling drugs.' "161
The tip further alleged that the defendants lived" 'on Greenway, off
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.' "162
Cir. 1970) Brethauer, 174 Colo. at 42-43, 482 P.2d at 375 (Hodges, J., dissenting); see
Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
158. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
159. /d. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. The specific question presented for review was whether "detailed information
provide to police by an anonymous informer, coupled with government corroboration of
the information, provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant?" Peti
tioner's Opening Brief on Merits at i, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments on this issue, the Court ordered
the parties in Gates to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified to permit the admissibility of evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in
the reasonable belief that their search-and-seizure conduct was consistent with the fourth
amendment. The Court, however, "with apologies to all," declined to address this good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, on the ground that it was never raised before,
nor passed upon by, the Illinois courts. G(Jt~, 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
161. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
162. Id.
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The message went on to relate that the defendants made most of
their drug purchases in Florida, with Susan Gates driving the family
car to Florida and leaving it there to be " 'loaded up' " with drugs. 163
Lance Gates would then fly down to Florida and drive the vehicle
back home. Meanwhile, Susan Gates would fly back to Illinois, after
having dropped the car off in Florida. l64
In addition, the tip predicted that Susan would be driving down
to Florida on " 'May 3,' " and that Lance would be " 'flying down in
a few days to drive it back.' "165 The tip then alleged that when
Lance "'drives the car back[,] he has the trunk loaded with over
$100,000.00 in drugs.''' Further, stated the message, the Gates' pres
ently" 'have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.' "166
The report imparted. the fact that the Gates' bragged that they .
never had to work, making their "'entire living on pushers,' " and
concluded with the" 'guarantee [that] if you watch them carefully
you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drug
dealers, who visit their home often.' "167
The letter was referred to Detective Mader, who decided to pur
sue the tip. Mader's investigation revealed that Lance Gates had an
Illinois driver's license, and was residing with his wife in Blooming
dale. Ije also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Air
port that one "L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines
flight 245 to West Palm Beach, Florida, scheduled to depart from
Chicago on May 5th at 4:15 p.m. 168
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug En
forcement Administration (DEA) to place the May 5th Eastern Air
lines flight under surveillance. The Agent later reported to Mader
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in Florida
had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and take a taxicab to a
nearby Holiday Inn. The agents further reported that Gates went to
a room registered to a Susan Gates, and that, at 7:00 a.m. the next
day, Gates and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a Mercury
automobile bearing Illinois registration plates and drove northbound
on an interstate highway frequently used by travelers driving the
Chicago area. In addition, the DEA agent advised Mader that the
registration plate number on the Mercury was registered to a Hornet
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also informed Mader that
the driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was
approximately twenty to twenty-four hours.169
Mader then executed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing.
facts, and submitted it to an Illinois magistrate, along with a copy of
the anonymous letter. The magistrate, making a finding of probable
cause on the basis of the tip, as corroborated by the law enforcement.
investigation, issued a search warrant for the Gates' residence and
for their motor vehicle pO
On May 7th, at 5:15 a.m., approximately thirty-six hours after
he had departed from Chicago by air, Lance Gates, along with his
wife Susan, returned to his residence in Bloomingdale, driving the
motor vehicle in which they had left West Palm Beach some twenty
two hours earlier. The Bloomingdale police were waiting for them,
and conducted a search of the trunk of the Mercury which uncov
ered a large quantity of marijuana. A search of the defendants'
home revealed additional marijuana, as well as weapons and other
contraband. 171
The defendants successfully moved to suppress the fruits of
these searches, persuading the Illinois courts that the warrant had
been issued without probable cause.172 A majority of the Supreme
Court of Illinois observed that, standing alone, the anonymous tip
could not provide the basis for a magistrate's detemination of the
existence of probable cause. 173 The majority found that the letter to
the Bloomingdale Police Department was deficient in establishing
that its author was credible or his information reliable, and in pro
viding an adequate basis for the writer's predictions regarding the
criminal activities of the defendants. Thus, the tip failed to satisfy
either the veracity or the basis-of-knowledge prong of the Aguilar
test}74
The majority opinion next analyzed Detective Mader's affidavit
to determine whether it might be capable of supplementing the tip
with information sufficient to permit a finding of probable cause.
Again, however, it concluded that there was lacking sufficient infor
mation, even as supplemented by the affidavit, to sustain a detemina
169. Id. at 2325-26.
170. See id. at 2326.
171. Id.
172. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981).
173. Id. at 386, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
174. Id. at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91. The Supreme Court of the United States
was "inclined to agree" with this assessment. 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
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tion of probable cause. 17S First, the majority opinion found that the
Aguilar-Spinelli veracity prong had not been satisfied because there
was no legitimate basis for a determination by either the magistrate
or Detective Mader that the anonymous informant was credible. 176
It rejected the notion that self-verifying detail in an informer's report
may be resorted to to establish the credibility of an informant or the
reliability of his information, thereby satisfying the veracity prong of
Aguilar-Spinelli. To the court, a fabricated story could just as easily
be based upon fine detail as it could be upon a rough outline.
Hence, minute detail did not inform the court about veracity}77
In addition, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that the
letter from the anonymous informer gave no indication to the re
viewing magistrate of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the de
fendants' criminal activities. 178 Not only had the report failed to
supply sufficient detail to permit an inference that the informant had
a reliable basis for his allegations, but also the corroborative evi
dence contained in Detective Mader's affidavit was only of innocent
activity.179 Therefore, because the anonymous tip had failed to sat
isfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli inqUiry,180 and the corrobo
rative evidence contained in the supporting affidavit was insufficient
to cure the deficiency in either prong, there was an absence of prob
able cause for the warrant. 181
After comparing the specific detail of the tip and the corroborat
ing information in the Gates affidavit with the situation presented in
Draper v. United States, 182 Justice Moran was persuaded that the
Draper analysis was dispositive of the issue raised. In his dissent in
Gates, he argued that the specificity of detail in the letter, coupled
with the corroboration of every detail of the informant's report by
the police investigation, was sufficient to satisfy the underlying basis
of-knowledge prong ofAguilar-Spinelli}83 Furthermore, the specific
information contained in the tip, subsequently verified by the law
enforcement officers, demonstrated the credibility and reliability of
the informer's allegations, thereby satisfying the veracity prong of
175. 85 Ill. 2d at 386-87, 423 N.E.2d at 891-92.
176. Id. at 385, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
177. Id. at 388, 423 N.E.2d at 892. The court did observe that self-verifying detail
may be used to satisfy the basis-or-knowledge test. Id.
178. Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
179. Id. at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
180. See iii. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 891; see also Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
181. See 85 Ill.2d at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
182. 358 U.S. 307 (1959); see infra text accompanying notes 220-28.
183. 85 Ill. 2d at 393-94, 423 N.E.2d at 895 (Moran, J., dissenting).
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Aguilar-Spinelli}84 Although Justice Moran acknowledged that the
corroborating information related to innocent activity, it was, in this
case, "endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the inform
ant's tip." 185
To Justice Moran, then, the "determining factor" in complying
with both prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli and establishing probable cause
is "the specificity of the tip combined with the police verification by
investigation."186 Because that had been accomplished in this case,
and the issuance of the warrant in question was consistent with the
rationale underlyingAguilar-Spinelli, the defendants' right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated. 187
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the Court
repudiated the two-prong analysis developed and refined in Aguilar
Spinelli, and replaced it with a totality-of-the-circumstances ap
proach in which the elements of an informant's "veracity," "reliabil
ity," and "basis of knowledge" would not be treated as "entirely
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case." 188 Although the Court considered these elements as being
"highly relevant" in assessing the value of an informant's tip, it nev
ertheless believed that they should be examined as "closely inter
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense,
practical question whether there is 'probable cause' " for the issuance
of a warrant. 189
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Rehnqu"ist opined
that probable cause was too "fluid" a concept - "turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts" - to lend
itself to "a neat set" of legal commands. 190 Compounding this lack
of fixity is the variability of informants' tips,191 which "doubtless
come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of per
sons."192 It was readily apparent, therefore, to the majority, that
"[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity."193
Id. at 394, 423 N.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 395, 423 N.E.2d at 896.
Id. at 395, 423 N.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 396, 423 N.E.2d at 896.
188. 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28 (footnote omitted).
189. Id. at 2328.
190. Id. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court had ob
served that the "quantum of information which constitutes probable cause. . must be
measured by the/acts of the particular case." Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
191. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
192. Id. at 2328.
193. Id. at 2329.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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Moreover, continued Justice Rehnquist, there are "persuasive
arguments" against according the elements of an informant's verac
ity or reliability and his basis of knowledge the independent status
required by theAguilar-Spinelli analysis. Instead, these elements are
"better understood" as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the
circumstances approach that should guide determinations of prob
able cause. Thus, under this approach, a deficiency in one element
may be compensated, in assessing the overall reliability of an in
former's report or tip, by a strong showing as to the other,. "or by
some other indicia of reliability."194
Justice Rehnquist cited the following as illustrative examples of
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis:
(a) if an informant is known for the "unusual reliability of his
predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality,
his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis
of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a
finding of probable cause based on ,his tip"; .
(b) if a report of criminal activity is received from an "unques
tionably honest citizen. . .-which if fabricated would subject
him to criminalliability-" it will not be necessary to subject
the basis of his knowledge to "rigorous scrutiny"; and
(c) even if some doubt is entertained as to a particular inform
ant's motives, his "explicit and detailed description of alleged
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed
first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise
be the case."19S
These examples, then, demonstrate the "balanced assesment of
the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unre
liability) attending an informant's tip" 196 sanctioned under the total
ity-of-the-circumstances approach. In contrast, reasoned Justice
Rehnquist, the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test has "encouraged an
excessively technical dissection of informants tips, with undue atten
tion being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced
from the other facts presented to [a reviewing] magistrate."197
194. Id. This analysis is a variation of the standard of reasonableness, determined
by "the facts and circumstances - the total atmosphere of the case," adopted by the court
in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
195. 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
196. Id. at 2330.
197. Id. As examples of such "dissection," reflecting a "rigid application" of the
Aguilar-Spinelli rules, the majority cited People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29,482 P.2d 369
(1971) (en bane); People v. Palanza, 55 lli. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978); and
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Because only the probability of criminal wrongdoing is the stan
dard of probable cause,198 and the warrant process involves numer
ous laymen applying "nontechnical, common-sense judgments,"
technical requirements of elaborate specificity, appropriate to more
formal legal proceedings, are inappropriate to proceedings involving
determinations of probable cause. 199 Moreover, the majority ob
served, the inherent subtleties of the two-pronged test, compounded
by the informal, "often hurried context" in which it must be applied,
are "particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining prob
able cause."200
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist continued, reviewing courts should
pay great deference to a magistrate's finding of probable cause, and
should not subject the constitutional sufficiency of supporting affida
vits for warrants to an "after-the-fact-scrutiny" that takes the form of
a "de novo" review. 201 For a court to engage in a "'grudging or neg
ative attitude' " towards warrants, by interpreting supporting " 'affi
davits in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner,' "
would run counter to the strong preference of the fourth amendment
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.202 The net result
might be an increased reliance by law enforcement officers on war
rantless searches and seizures. 203
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the "traditional [in contrast with the Aguilor
Spinelli] standard" for reviewing a magistrate's determination of
probable cause has been that the fourth amendment requires only a
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. 204 Accordingly, re
affirmation of this standard will "better serve[]" the purpose of en
couraging the police to seek recourse to the warrant procedure, and
Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). See supra text accompanying
notes 120-57.
198. Although probability is the acknowledged standard of probable cause, Gales,
103 S. Ct. at 2330; Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion) (a
"'practical, nontechnical' probability"); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, Justice Rehnquist
quoted, with approval, Chief Justice Marshall's observation in Locke that "the term
'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation. . . .It importS a seizure made under circumstances which
warrant suspicion." 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (citing Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348)(emphasis
added).
199. 103 S. Ct. at 2330-31.
200. Id. at 2331.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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is "more consistent" with a reviewing court's deference to determina
tions of probable cause by magistrates than is the two-pronged test
of Aguilar-Spinelli. 205
Of final relevance to the majority's repudiation of Aguilar
Spinelli was the belief that the strictures which "inevitably accom
pany" the two-pronged test cannot avoid "seriously impeding" the
task of effective law enforcement.206 If that test must be "rigorously"
applied in every case, anonymous tips will prove to be of "greatly
diminished value in police work."207 In the opinion of the majority,
it could not be expected of "[o]rdinary citizens [to provide] extensive
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations."208 Likewise,
noted the majority, the veracity of anonymous informants is "by hy
pothesis largely unknown, and unknowable."209 Consequently, tips
from such persons seldom could survive a "rigorous application" of
either of the Aguilar-Spinelli prongs. Yet, such reports, particularly
when supplemented by independent police investigation, will con
tribute frequently to the solution of crimes. While a "conscientious
assessment" of the basis for crediting anonymous tips is required by
fourth amendment jurisprudence, a standard that leaves "virtually
no place for anonymous citizen informants is not."210
"For all these reasons," concluded the majority, it was ''wiser to
abandon" the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test, and, in its place, to
"reaffirm" the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that ''tradition
ally" has informed determinations of probable cause. 211 This will re
quire a magistrate, passing upon an application for a warrant,
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, includ
ing the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 212
And, it will be the duty of a reviewing court "simply to ensure" that
there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's conclusion that
probable cause existed. 213
205.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2331-32.
Id. at 2332 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"We are convinced," observed the majority, that this "flexible,
easily applied standard" will "better achieve" the accomodation of
private and public interests that the fourth amendment requires than
does the Aguilar-Spinelli approach. 214
Although the Gates majority referred to its totality-of-the-cir
cumstances analysis as a "standard," it never provided meaningful
structure or guidelines for probable cause inquiries by magistrates
reviewing applications for warrants, other than a general endorse
ment of "a practical, common-sense" assessment of probable
cause,215 and an admonition that" 'bare bones' affidavits" would not
be sufficient to establish probable cause. 216 Thus, once a magistrate
determines that an affidavit contains more than "bare conclu
sions,"217 he will have to decide, "based solely on 'practical[ity], and
'common-sense,' whether there is a fair probability that contraband
will be found in a particular place."218 This means, then, that the
question of whether the probable cause standard is to be "diluted" in
informant cases will be left solely to the commonsense judgements
of magistrates, and "some showing of facts" that an informer is a
credible person who has obtained his information in a reliable way
would not be an express prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant. 219
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to the affi
davit in Gates, the majority had no difficulty in determining that the
corroboration of details of the informant's tip by independent police
work was sufficient to establish probable cause. Believing that the
approach developed in J)raper v. United States, 220 the "classic case"
on the importance and value of corroborative efforts of law enforce
ment officials,221 represented controlling precedent, the Gates major
ity briefly summarized the J)raper analysis.
In J)raper, an informant named Hereford, who had previously
provided accurate and reliable information, reported to law officers
on September 3d that the defendant had recently taken up residence
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2332-33.
217. Id. at 2332.
218. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (brackets in original); see
iii. at 2332-33 ("area" beyond the "'bare bones' affidavits" does not lend itself to "a
prescribed set of rules," such as that developed from Spinelli; rather, ''the flexible, com
mon-sense standard. . .better serves the purposes of the . . . probable cause
requirement").
219. See 103 S. Ct at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
221. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
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in Denver and "'was peddling narcotics to several addicts' in that
city."222 Four days later, on September 7th, Hereford further re
ported that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before by
train, and would be returning by train with three ounces of heroin,
either on the morning of September 8th or the morning of the 9th. 223
Hereford also gave a detailed physical description of the defendant
and of the clothing he would be wearing, describing Draper as a
Negro of light brown complexion, 27 years of age, 5 feet, 8 inches in
height, weighing approximately 160 pounds, and wearing a light
colored coat, brown slacks, and black shoes. He also advised that
Draper habitually" 'walked real fast.' "224 It does not appear, how
ever, that Hereford provided any indication of the basis for his
information.
.
Law officers took up suveillance at the Denver Union Station on
the morning of September 8th, but did not see anyone fitting the
description that Hereford had supplied. Repeating the process the
following morning, the officers spotted a person, having "the exact
physical attributes" and wearing the "precise clothing" described by
the informant, alight from an incoming Chicago train and start
walking" 'fast'" toward the exit. 225 He was carrying a tan zipper
bag in his right hand, and his left hand was thrust in the pocket of
his raincoat. The officers intercepted the passenger, and placed him
under arrest. An incidental search uncovered two envelopes contain
ing heroin clutched in his left hand, and a syringe in the tan zipper
bag. 226
In sustaining the legality of the warrantless arrest, the Supreme
Court noted that in the process of investigating a tip from an in
former of proven reliability, the officers, had "personally verified
every facet of the information" imparted, except whether the defend
ant had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin
on his person or in his bag. 227 The Court reasoned that "surely, with
every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally veri
fied," the officers had probable cause to believe that "the remaining
unverified bit of Hereford's information- that Draper would have
the heroin with him- was likewise true. "228
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

358 U.S. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 309 & n.2.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id.
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Applying the Draper analysis to the showing of probable cause
in Gates, the majority argued that the facts obtained through in
dependent law enforcement investigation "at least suggested" that
the defendants were involved in drug trafficking. 229 The Court took
note of the fact that Florida is ''well-known as a source" of illegal
drugs. 23o Furthermore, Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach, his brief,
overnight stay in a hotel, and "apparent immediate return north to
Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in West Palm
Beach," was as suggestive of a prearranged drug run as it was of an
innocent vacation trip.231
In addition, the Gates majority reasoned that the magistrate
could rely upon the information contained in the anonymous letter,
which had been corroborated "in major part" by the investigating
officers. 232 Although the informant in Draper had supplied reliable
information on previous occasions, while the credibility and relia
bility of the anonymous informant in Gates were unknown to the
Bloomingdale police, this distinction, to the majority, became "far
less significant" after the independent investigative work of Detec
tive Mader had occured. 233 "The corroboration of the letter's predic
tions that the Gates' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates
would fiy to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive
the [family] car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions were also
true."234 Because the informer had been proven accurate about some
predictions, it was more likely that he was probably right about the
other facts.235 Therefore, in the opinion of the majority, this type of
229. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
230.· Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2334-35. The fact that the verification of details contained in the letter
amounted only to corroboration of seemingly innocent activity was of little moment to
the majority. In the first place, the activity, while seemingly innocent, took on a suspi
cious character in the light of the initial tip. Id. at 2335 n.l3. Secondly, the standard of
probable cause is one only of "a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,
not an actual showing of such activity." Id. From this the majority reasoned, "[b)y
hypothesis, [that innocent behavior) frequently will provide the basis for a showing of
probable cause." Id To require otherwise, thought the majority, would be to "sub silentio
impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our
citizens demands." Id Therefore, "the relevant inquiry," to the majority, in making a
determination of probable cause, "is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or
'guilty,' but the degree ofsuspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts."
Id (emphasis added); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
233. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
234. Id
235. Id; see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring).
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" 'reliability' " or " 'veracity,' " while not necessarily adequate to sat
isfy "some views" of the veracity prong of Aguilar-Spinelli, was suffi
cient for the "practical, common-sense judgement called for in
making a probable cause determination."236 The majority was satis
fied that, for purposes of assessing probable cause, it was enough
that corroboration through other sources of information be sufficient
to establish a substantial basis for crediting the tip.237
Applying these criteria to the Gates tip, the majority found that
"the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just
to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip,
but [also] to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily pre
dicted."238 Moreover, "[t]he letter writer's accurate information as to
the travel plans of each of the Gates was of a character likely ob
tained only from the Gates themselves, or from someone familiar
with their not entirely ordinary travel plans."239 Thus, a magistrate
could properly conclude that "[i]f the informant had access to accu
rate information of this type. . .it was not unlikely that he also had
access to reliable information of the Gates' alleged criminal activi
ties."240 Although there was no certainty that the Gates' travel plans
had not been "learned from a talkative neighbor or travel agent," it
was enough, for purposes of probable cause analysis, that there ex
isted a "fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had
obtained his entire story either from the Gates or someone they
trusted."24I "[J]ust this probability" was provided by corroboration
of "major portions of the letter's predictions."242 The majority con
cluded "that the judge issuing the warrant had a 'substantial basis
for. . .conclud[ing)' that probable cause to search the Gates' home
and car existed. "243
236. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
237. ld; see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960).
238. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
239. ld
240. ld
ld at 2336.
ld
243. ld Justice Blackmun provided the fifth, and crucial, vote to overrule theAgui
lar-Spinelli rules. His decision to join the majority was not surprising. In his concurring
241.
242.

opinion in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), Justice Blackmun expressed his
displeasure with Spinelli in strong terms. Not only did he believe that Spinelli had been
"wrongly decided," at the Supreme Court level, but also that, if the decision were his to
make, he "would overrule it." ld at 586 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Of further interest is
the fact that Justice Blackmun had been a member of the majority of the Eighth Circuit
who had upheld the legality of the Spinelli affidavit.ld at 585-86. Of such little ironies is
legal history made.
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Justice White concurred in the judgement in Gates, because he
believed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule gov
erned the result in this case. 244 However, Justice White's opinion
amounted to a dissent on the issue of rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli
standards. While he agreed that the warrant was properly issued
under the circumstances, he believed that this conclusion was consis
tent with Aguilar-Spinelli. 245
To Justice White, the lower court's characterization of the
Gates' activities as being innocent was "dubious."246 To the con
trary, he viewed their behavior as being "quite suspicious."247 Lance
Gates' flight to an area notorious for narcotic trafficking, the brief
overnight stay in a hotel, and apparent immediate return trip north,
suggested a pattern that has been recognized by trained law enforce
ment officers as indicative of illegal drug-dealing activity.248
But Justice White would have upheld the warrant even if only
"completely innocuous activities" had been corroborated. 249 To him,
the "critical issue" was not whether the activities observed by the
investigating law officers were "innocent or suspicious."25o Rather,
the issue was whether it could be inferred from the actions of the
suspects, that the informant is "credible" and that he has obtained
his information "in a reliable manner."251 Moreover, this corrobora
tion, based upon independent police work, could satisfy both the ve
racity and basis-of-knowledge prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 252
Justice White believed that the police investigation in Gates
"satisfactorily demonstrated," as it had in Draper v. United States,253
that the informer's tip was as trustworthy as one that would alone
have satisfied the Aguilar-Spinelli rules. 254 The police had corrobo
rated the defendant's travel plans, as detailed in the anonymous let
ter. From this, Justice White argued, the reviewing magistrate "could
244. 103 S. Ct. at 2336 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
245. Id at 2347.
246. Id at 2348.
247. Id
248. Id at 2348; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
249. 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
250. Id
251. Id; see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d at 1316.
252. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 n.22. Justice White disagreed with Justice Brennan, who, in
his dissenting Gales opinion, appeared to suggest that "the basis of knowledge prong
could be satisfied by detail in the tip alone, but not by independant police work." Id; see
id at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the "rules would
indeed be strange" if this were the case. Id at 2349 n.22.
253. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
254. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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reasonably have inferred" that the informant, who had "specific
knowledge" of the defendants' "unusual" itinerary, had not
fabricated his story, and that his information had been obtained in a
reliable way.255 This, observed Justice White, was sufficient to sat
isfy the Aguilar-Spinelli standard of probability of criminal activ
ity.256 He therefore concluded that the judgement of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, invalidating the warrant, had to be reversed. 257
Because Justice White reached his conclusion within the frame
work of Aguilar-Spinelli, he did not believe it was necessary to over
rule Aguilar-Spinelli in order to arrive at the correct result in
Gates .258 Justice White believed that, when properly applied, the
Aguilar-Spinelli rules play "an appropriate role" in determinations
of probable cause. He was concerned, moreover, that the position
adopted by the majority "may foretell an evisceration of the prob
able cause standard."259
Justice White took strong exception to the majority's attempt to
integrate the veracity and basis-of-knowledge tests, so that a defi
ciency in one could be compensated by a strong showing in the
other. 260 He was particularly uncomfortable with the prospect of a
finding of probable cause based solely on a tip from an informant of
previously demonstrated reliability or "an unquestionably honest
citizen," when the report "thoroughly" fails to establish the basis
upon which the information had been obtained. 261 If this is so, rea
soped Justice White, "then it must follow a fortiori" that a purely
conclusory affidavit from a law enforcement officer, known by the
magistrate to be honest and experienced, must also be acceptable. It
would be "quixotic," indeed, if such a statement from an honest in
former, but not from an honest law officer, could furnish probable
cause. 262 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that mere
conclusory assertions or beliefs of law officers do not satisfy the
probable cause requirement,263 and Justice White feared that tpe
majority's holding could be interpreted as "implicitly rej~cting"
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2349-50.
258. Id. at 2350.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560,564-65 (1971); Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108
09 (dictum); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47.
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those prior teachings. 264
Justice White acknowledged that the majority may not have in
tended "so drastic a result," and noted that the Gates Court had ex
pressly reaffirmed the validity of cases, such as Nathanson v. United
States ,265 that have held that, no matter how reliable an affiant-of
ficer may be, a warrant may not issue unless the affidavit discloses a
supporting factual basis. 266 He interpreted the majority position as
limiting these cases to situations involving affidavits containing only
"bare conclusions" and holding that, if an affidavit contains "any
thing more," it should be left to the reviewing magistrate to decide,
"based solely on 'practical[ity), and 'common-sense,''' whether there
is "a fair probability" that objects subject to seizure will be found in
a particular place. 267
Thus, it appeared to Justice White, from his reading of the ma
jority opinion, that the question of whether the probable cause stan
dard is "to be diluted" was to be entrusted to "the common-sense
judgments of issuing magistrates."268 He was "reluctant," however,
to approve any standard that did not "expressly" require, as a pre
requisite to the issuance of a warrant in cases involving tips from
informants, "some showing of facts from which an inference may be
drawn" that the informer is a credible person whose information has
been obtained in a reliable way.269
In conclusion, while Justice White agreed that the Court was
"correctly concerned with the fact that some lower courts ha[d] been
applying AgUilar-Spinelli in an unduly rigid manner," he still be
lieved that, "with clarification of the rule of corroborating informa
tion, the lower courts are fully able to properly interpret Aguilar
Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid applications."27o "I may be
wrong," Justice White was frank to acknowledge, and "it ultimately
may prove to be the case that the only profitable instruction we can
provide to magistrates is to rely on common sense."271 Still, "the
question [of] whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis
for [the] issuance of a warrant will often be a difficult one," and Jus
tice White would "at least attempt to provide more adequate gui
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
290 U.S. 41 (1933).
103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id
Id
Id
Id at 2350-51.
Id at 2351.
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dance by clarifying Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those
cases with Draper before totally abdicating our responsibility in this
area."272 "Hence," he could not join the majority opinion, "rejecting
the Aguilar-Spinelli rules."273
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, because
Detective Mader's affidavit failed to satisfy even the new relaxed
standard announced by the majority.274 First, the dissent argued
that the informant's accuracy had been compromised by the discrep
ancy between his allegation that Susan Gates would drive the family
car to Florida, where she would leave it to be loaded up with drugs,
and then fly back home, and the fact that Detective Mader's affidavit
reported that she "left the West Palm Beach area driving the Mer
cury northbound."275 To Justice Stevens, this "material mistake"
undermined the reasonableness of relying upon the tip as a basis for
making a forcible entry into a private residence. 276 Moreover, it
"cast doubt" on the informer's hypothesis that the defendants had
"'over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.' "277 The inform
ant's prediction, of an itinerary that always kept one defendant in
Bloomingdale, suggested that the defendants were reluctant to leave
their home unguarded because they had something valuable hidden
there. That inference, reasoned Justice Stevens, "obviously" could
not be drawn once it became known that the defendants were "actu
ally together over a thousand miles from home."278 Finally, Justice
Stevens believed that the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct ap
pear "substantially less unusual" than the informer had described it.
In short, he could find nothing "unusual" or "probative of criminal
activity" in the "mere facts" that Mrs. Gates was in West Palm
Beach with the family car, that she was subsequently joined by her
husband at the Holiday Inn, and that the couple drove north to
gether the following morning. 279
Accordingly, Justice Stevens could not accept the majority's
"casual conclusion" that, prior to the arrival of the defendants in
272. Id (emphasis added).
273. Id
274. Id at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, dismissed this complaint, not
ing that the Court has never required that "informants used by the police be infallible,"
and that probable cause, particularly when law enforcement oficers have obtained a war
rant, does "not require the perfection the dissent finds necessary." Id at 2335 n.14.
276. Id at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Id
278. Id
279. Id
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Bloomingdale, there was probable cause to justify a valid entry and
search of their home. 28o He noted that no one knew who the inform
ant in this case was, or what had motivated him to write the letter.
Furthermore, given that the report's predictions were "faulty in one
significant respect," and were corroborated by nothing more than
"ordinary innocent activity," Justice Stevens could only "surmise"
that the majority's evaluation of the warrant's validity had been
"color~d by subsequent events."281
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's attempt to find sup
port for its holding in the .Draper analysis. 282 He observed that
.Draper was readily distinguishable because that case involved the
proven reliability of a known informant. Here, by contrast, the po
lice were dealing with an anonymous informer, and some of his in
formation was neither accurate nor reliable. 283
Justice Stevens concluded that, "[i]n a fact-bound inquiry of this
sort, the judgment of three levels of state courts, all of whom are
better able to evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous infor
mants in Bloomingdale, Illinois, than we are, should be entitled to at
least a presumption of accuracy."284 Although the veracity and basis
of-knowledge factors were now to be considered together, under the
majority's analysis, "as circumstanceS whose totality must be ap
praised," the lower courts had found "neither factor present."285 In
addition, the "supposed 'other indicia' " took the form of activity
that was not "particularly remarkable."286 Therefore, Justice Stevens
could "not understand how the Court [could] find that the 'totality'
so far exceeds the sum of its 'circumstances.' "287
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, authored the prin
cipal dissent in Gates. He characterized the majority's rejection of
the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test as a method for evaluating the
280. Id. at 2361.
Id. (footnote omitted).
282. Id. at 2361 n. 7.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2361-62 (footnote omitted).
285. Id. at 2362 n. 8.
286. Id.
287. Id. Justice Stevens would have vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois and remanded the case for reconsideration on the issue of the validity of a war
rantless search of the defendants' automobile in the light of the intervening decision in
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Under Ross, the search of the Gates' automo
bile may have been valid if the officers had probable cause, after the defendants had
arrived back in Bloomingdale, to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. 103 S.
Ct. at 2361, 2362 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 806-09, 817-21, 823
281.

25.
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validity of a warrant based on hearsay as "unjustified and ill-ad
vised."288 In similar vein, he chastised the majority for overstating
its case that Aguilar-Spinelli had seriously impeded effective lawen
forcement and rendered anonymous tips "valueless in police
work."289
As Justice Brennan viewed the situation, the way in which the
Aguilar-Spinelli standards had been repudiated had to be a matter
"of particular concern to all Americans," because such a repudiation
had given ''virtually no consideration to the value of insuring that
findings of probable cause are based on information that a magis
trate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by an
honest or credible person."290 Thus, he shared Justice White's fear
that the repudiation of Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of the totality-of-the
circumstances test" 'may foretell an evisceration of the probable
cause standard... .' "291
To Justice Brennan, the majority's "complete failure to provide
any persuasive reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly
reflects impatience with what it perceives to be 'overly technical'
rules governing searches and seizures under the [fjourth
[a]mendment."292 Hence, he interpreted words such as "'practical,'
'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's opinion,
[as] but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards [law
enforcement] practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
[flourth [a]mendment."293
Neither was he impressed with "the Court's concern over the
horrors of drug trafficking," as apparent justification for curing so
cial evils by a reduction of individual rightS. 294 To take this path,in
his opinion, even in innocence, could well lead to the irretrievable
impairment of fundamental constitutional protections. 295
Justice Brennan believed that the rejection of Aguilar-Spinelli
288. 103 S. Ct. at 235 I (Brennan, I., dissenting).
289. Id. at 2359.
290. /d.
291. Id (quoting id. at 2350 (White, I., concurring in the judgment).
292. /d. at 2359 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. For a recent example of the Court's "concern" over these "horrors," see
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), where the Court, in its desire to legitimize
unorthodox law enforcement methods of combatting drug trafficking, reached out to re
solve the constitutionality of the seizure of personal luggage on less than probable cause
and the exposure of that luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog. See id. at 2646
(Brennan, I., concurring); see also id. at 2652-53 (Blackmun, I., concurring)(criticizing
the Court's "haste to resolve the dog-sniff issue").
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struck at the heart of "the judiciary's role as the only effective guard
ian of [flourth [a]mendment rights."296 In recognition of this role.
the Supreme Court had developed a set of coherent rules governing
a magistrate's assessment of applications for warrants and the show
ings that are required to support a finding of probable cause. 297 This
was deemed necessary to ensure that only a neutral and detached
magistrate should determine whether there is probable cause to sup
port the issuance of a warrant. 298 The Supreme Court. in order to
emphasize the role of the magistrate as "an independent arbiter" of
probable cause, and to insure that searches and seizures are not ef
fected on less than probable cause. has insisted, as Justice Brennan
noted, that law enforcement officers provide magistrates with the un
derlying facts and circumstances that support their conclusions of
criminal activity or wrongdoing. 299 This insistence resulted in the
Aguilar-Spinelli rules, which have served to advance the substantive
value. under fourth amendment jurisprudence. that findings of prob
able cause. and attendant intrusions upon individual security and
privacy. should not be sanctioned unless there has been some assur
ance that the information on which they are based has been obtained
in a reliable way by a credible person. 3OO
As applied to police officers, Justice Brennan explained. the
Aguilar-Spinelli standards focus on the way in which the information
has been acquired. As applied to informants, the rules focus on the
credibility or honesty of the informant and on the reliability of the
way in which the information has been obtained. 301
Insofar as it is more complicated. Justice Brennan observed, an
evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay information involves "a
more difficult inquiry."302 Thus, the nature of the process suggests a
need to structure the inquiry to ensure a greater degree of accuracy.
The standards announced in Aguilar, and refined by Spinelli. have
fulfilled that need. 303 The standards inform law officers of what in
formation they have to provide and inform magistrates of what in
formation "they should demand."304 Further, continued Justice
Brennan, the standards also inform magistrates of the subsidiary
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

103 S. Ct. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
£d.
£d.

Id. at 2352.
Id. at 2355.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1983)

PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES

375

findings they are required to make in order to make an ultimate find
ing of probable cause. 30S Accordingly, by requiring law officers to
provide certain crucial information to magistrates, and by structur
ing probable cause inquiries by magistrates, the Aguilar-Spinelli
standards function to assure the role of the magistrate as an "in
dependent arbiter" of probable cause, ensure a greater degree of ac
curacy in probable cause determinations, and advance the
"important process value, which is intimately related to substantive
[flourth [a]mendment concerns," of having neutral and independent
magistrates, and not the police, or informants, determine whether
there exists probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. 306
It was apparent, therefore, to Justice Brennan, that the tests es
tablished by Aguilar and Spinelli structure the magistrate's probable
cause inquiry and, more importantly, guard against arbitrary intru
sions upon the security and privacy of the individual that are sup
ported by inadequate findings of probable cause. 307 To Justice
Brennan, there was nothing inconsistent between the rules and their
"effects" and a "'practical, nontechnical' conception of probable
cause."308 Once a magistrate has determined, argued Justice Bren
nan, that he has been presented with information that he can reason
ably conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by a credible
person, he will have "ample room to use his common sense and to
apply a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause."309
Justice Brennan found the structure provided by Aguilar
Spinelli particularly beneficial to probable cause analysis of tips
from anonymous informants. "By definition, nothing is known
about an anonymous informant's identity, honesty, or reliability."310
There was no basis for treating such persons as presumptively relia
ble, and it could not be assumed that information provided by them
had been obtained in a reliable way. Certainly, as Justice Brennan
viewed the situation, if conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are un
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id. at 2355, 2356 n.6; see Spinel/i, 393 u.S. at 415-16.
103 S. Ct. at 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2357.
/d. at 2357-58.
310. Id. at 2356. It has been suggested that anonymous informants should be
treated as presumptively unreliable, as their motives cannot be properly assessed by
either the police or magistrates, and neither the police nor magistrates can possibly know
how informants have obtained their information, or be able to secure additional informa
tion from them. See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause:
Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in llinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99,
107 (1982).
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acceptable when provided by the police, who are presumptively reli
able, or from known informants, then there could not "possibly be
any rational basis for accepting conclusory allegations from anony
mous informants."311 Hence, as a means of assuring that probable
cause findings, and attendant intrusions, are based on information
provided by credible or honest persons who have acquired the infor
mation in reliable way, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules "must be applied"
to tips from anonymous informants. 312
The majority claimed that the Aguilar-Spinelli rules could not
be reconciled with the fact that laymen frequently serve as magis
trates. 313 Justice Brennan rejected this claim and argued that the
rules not only helped to structure probable cause inquiries, but also,
if "properly interpreted," could actually assist the nonlawyer magis
trate in making determinations of probable cause. 314
Justice Brennan closed his dissenting opinion by taking the ma
jority to task for replacing Aguilar-Spinelli with a test that provided
no assurance that magistrates rather than police, or informants,
would continue to make determinations of probable cause; that im
posed no structure on probable cause inquiries by magistrates; and
that invited "the possibility that intrusions [might] be justified on less
than reliable information from an honest or credible person."315
"[T]oday's decision," in his opinion, "threatens to 'obliterate one of
the most. fundamental distinctions between our form of g<?vernment,
where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are
the law.' "316
The most unremarkable aspect of Gates was the result it
reached. Granted that the informant was anonymous, and did not
have a prior record of reliability; nevertheless, his report did contain
considerable detail about the operation of an interstate drug enter
prise. Furthermore, his tip contained information of a character
likely obtained only from the defendants themselves, or from some
one familiar with the inner workings of their operation. Thus, it
would have been proper for a magistrate to conclude that the in
former, while anonymous and with no prior record of trustworthi
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
333 U.S.

103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 2330-31.
Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16.
103 S. Ct. at 2539 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
10, 17 (1948» (emphasis added).
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ness, had access to reliable information of the Gates' alleged drug
activities ..
Although nothing was known of the informant's honesty or the
reliability of his sources, any deficiences were compensated by the
substantial amount of corroboration of the tip by independent police
work. Hence, when the magistrate was presented with such a range
of details, coupled with the degree of corroboration developed
through police investigation, he had before him a substantial show
ing of facts from which an inference could reasonably be drawn that
the informer was a credible person who had gathered his informa
tion in a reliable way. Accordingly, probable cause had been estab
lished for the issuance of the warrant.
Although Gates represents a step backward in fourth amend
ment jurisprudence, it was a step which gained impetus from deci
sions such as Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger.317 An excessive
desire to exploit an ever-expanding concept of individual liberties
has already brought about a backlash resulting in a retrenchment of
fifth amendment318 and habeas COrpUS319 protections. Unfortu
nately, as the holding in Gates demonstrates, an "overly technical
view"320 of supporting affidavits for warrants may also lead to "an
evisceration of the probable cause standard" under the fourth
amendment. 32\ In our zeal to strictly enforce procedural rules, and
to devise remedies for real or imagined injustices, we, of the legal
and judicial communities, have lost sight of substantive justice, and
have invited both the condemnation of the public322 and the counter
attacks of reactionary ideologues who, under the banners of effective
law enforcement and common sense, are busily engaged in disman
tling the basic constitutional structure of this country.
V.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

In Gates, Justice Rehnquist mounted a three-pronged attack on
the warrant machinery contemplated by the fourth amendment.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 120-57.
318. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834-35 (1983) (plurality
opinion).
319. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 549-52 (1981); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977), relt'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
320. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
321. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
322. See Morris v. Siappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1618 (1983); Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction witlt tlte Administration of Justice, 29 ABA ANNUAL REp. 395,
404-06 (1906).
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First, he relaxed the standard for evaluating the probable cause suffi
ciency of affidavits containing hearsay information from informants.
Second, he diminished the role of the independent magistrate in the
warrant process, by having him adopt a more sympathetic and per
missive view toward police practices in the name of common sense
and effective law enforcement. Finally, he laid the groundwork for
altering the meaning of probable cause, to the detriment of individ
ual rights. It is this multi-faceted assault on the warrant machinery,
and its long-term implications for fourth amendment jurisprudence,
that is so disturbing about Gales.
The Aguilar-Spinelli rules were established as a reaction of the
Supreme Court to "bare bones" affidavits containing mere con
clusory allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The standards laid
down by the rules reflected the Court's concern that the crucial role
of an independent judiciary in conducting probable cause inquiries
was being compromised by magistrates who were paying undue def
erence to claims of probable cause by law enforcement officers that
were not supported by a substantial factual basis. Thus, the stan
dards were designed to enhance the integrity of the warrant process
by preserving the independence and objectivity of the judiciary, and
to ensure a greater degree of accuracy in probable cause
determinations.
The Aguilar-Spinelli rules, however, were not written in stone,
and certainly could have been improved upon by clarifying the effect
of corroborating information on the basis-of-knowledge test. In fact,
Justice White, in his Gales concurrence, proposed just such a clarifi
cation. 323 Instead, however, the Court saw fit to repudiate Aguilar
Spinelli. In so doing, the Gales Court struck at the integrity and
independence of the judiciary in the warrant process. It did this by
downgrading the magistrate's central role in making determinations
of probable cause, and by encouraging the magistrate to abdicate his
responsibility in the probable cause process by deferring to the judg
ment of police officers in the name of effective law enforcement and
common sense.
As this article has attempted to show, the centerpieces of the
warrant machinery under the fourth amendment are an independent
judiciary and the standard of probable cause. 324 The Aguilar
Spinelli rules implemented the Supreme Court's commitment to
these principles, and were not at all inconsistent with any notions of
323. 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 7-57.
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effective law enforcement and common sense. Although application
of the rules created some problems, they were not of such a serious
or fundamental nature as to warrant outright repudiation. Yet, this
is exactly the drastic remedy upon which the Gates majority seized.
In so doing, the majority replaced theAguilar-Spinelli analysis with a
totality-of-the-circumstances approach that lacks sufficient specific
ity and analytical structure to adequately inform magistrates as to
what standard is required to protect the right of privacy secured by
the fourth amendment. The reader must ask himself, "Why?" Why
was it so necessary, so imperative, to reject and overrule Aguilar
Spinelli? Why wasn't clarification or modification invoked? Were
these alternatives even considered? If not, why not?
The answers to these questions lie not in the facts in Gates, nor
in the need to combat the "horrors" of the drug trade. The answers
are to be found in the basic legal philosophy of a current majority of
the Supreme Court. More particularly, the answers lie in an under
standing of the majority's perception of the relationship between
government and citizen. This is the critical key to a true understand
ing of Gates, one that strips the majority opinion of its graceful style
and pretentious adherence to effective law enforcement consistent
with constitutional principles. For underneath the Court's nostrum,
lies a message of narrow vision that is at odds with the fundamental
constitutional ideals upon which this country was established. The
warrant machinery designed by the fourth amendment is central to
these ideals, for it interposes an independent judiciary between the
state and the individual. The key components of this machinery are
a neutral magistrate and a standard of probable cause that reason
ably protects the security and privacy interests of the individual
without unduly hindering effective law enforcement. It is precisely
in these areas that the implications of Gates are most disturbing, and
where the clues to its true meaning, and portent of the future, are to
be found.
A.

Deficiencies in the Basis-of-Knowledge Prong

The first clue to Gates' true meaning appeared when Justice
Rehnquist offered an example of how the two-pronged analysis,
which had been directed into largely independent channels under
Aguilar-Spinelli, would be applied under the new totality-of-the-cir
cumstances approach. He cited United States v. Sellers 325 in support
of the principle that a deficiency in the basis-of-knowledge prong of
325. 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
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a tip from an unusually reliable informant would not be fatal to a
showing of probable cause. As Justice Rehnquist phrased the
proposition:
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unu
sual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activ
ities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set
forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an ab
solute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip.326

Although the Fifth Circuit, in Sellers, had acknowledged that
"the quantum of underlying circumstances which reveal the source
of the informer's knowledge necessary to sustain the affidavit is
clearly less than in cases where the indicia of informer reliability is
less dramatic," the court actually upheld the affidavit at issue pri
marily on the basis of the "wealth of detail" supplied by the inform
ant-a "wealth" that "outline[d] the administrative hierarchy of the
[defendants'] bookmaking operation"-from which the magistrate
"could have reasonably inferred" that the information was either the
product of the informant's personal knowledge or that the informer
had direct access to the defendants' gambling operation. 327 This
analysis in Sellers is thoroughly consistent with the Draper analysis
as well as with the Spinelli majority where Justice Harlan reasoned
that, in the absence of a statement detailing the circumstances in
which the information had been gathered, a description of a defend
ant's criminal activity in sufficient detail would permit the reviewing
magistrate to reasonably infer that the informant had obtained his
information or knowledge in a reliable way.328 Thus, Sellers, rather
than being at odds with Spinelli, remained loyal to its principles.
Moreover, how can "an informant's . . . 'basis of knowledge'
[be] ... highly relevant in determining the value of his report," as
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Gales ,329 and yet remain suffi
ciently irrelevant that a "failure ... to thoroughly set [it] forth [will]
. . . not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause. . .
[?]"330 Unfortunately, the Court offers no meaningful guidance to
magistrates beyond some general appeal to their common sense and
practical good judgment. Apparently, "bare bones" affidavits based
326. 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (emphasis added).
327. 483 F.2d at 41.
328. 393 U.S. at 416-17; accord, Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concur
ring in the judgment).
329. 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
330. Id. at 2329.
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upon nothing more than mere conclusory allegations of criminal
wrongdoing will not be sufficient. 331 And, when an affidavit contains
"anything more," then "it appears that the question whether the
probable cause standard is to be diluted is left to the common-sense
judgments of issuing magistrates."332
The net result, however, is to reduce the central importance of
the role of an independent judiciary in probable cause inquiries, and
to correspondingly enhance the role of the police and their infor
mants. This is readily apparent from the majority's emphasis upon
the past reliability of an informant, which, under the Court's new
equation, may be resorted to to compensate for a deficiency in the
basis of knowledge for a tip. Furthermore, this interpretation is rein
forced by the majority's belief that the Aguilar-Spinelli rules are in
consistent with the significant role played by laymen in the warrant
process, where "many warrants are - quite properly. . . - issued
on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen
applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal
legal proceedings."333 Similarly, the majority believed that the rules
"seriously imped[ed] the task of law enforcement," and "greatly di
minished [the] value [of anonymous tips] in police work."334 While
Justice Rehnquist denied that this was SO,335 one is left with the im
pression, as correctly perceived by Justice Brennan, that the majority
employed words, "such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common
sense,' as . . . but code words for an overly permissive attitude to
wards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
[t]ourth [a]mendment."336 Practicality and common sense have
their place in the law, but we should not pay homage to them at the
expense of basic constitutional rights. The message from Gates,
therefore, comes through loud and clear that magistrates should pay
more respect to the claims of law enforcement officers, who know far
more about the ways of criminals and what is needed to combat their
antisocial practices, and less attention to analytical assessments of
probable cause. Any standard that does not expressly require, as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant, a substantial showing of
facts from which an inference may be reasonably drawn that the in
former is a credible person and that his information was obtained or
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
/d. at 2330-31.
Id. at 2331; see id. at 2332.
See id. at 2333-34.
Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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gathered in a reliable way, will result in an evisceration of the prob
able cause standard and an impairment of the rights secured by the
fourth amendment. 337
Finally, this analysis also applies to Justice Rehnquist's belief
that an honest citizen's basis of knowledge need not be subjected to a
searching inquiry.338 Simply because a citizen is honest does not
mean that he is credible or that his information has been gathered in
a reliable way. In short, one may be honest and still remain naive
and gullible, easily swayed by the views or opinions of others, or by
items of gossip circulated by them.

B. Suspicion and the Standard of Probable Cause
The second, and more disturbing, implication emanating from
Gates is the introduction of the concept of suspicion into probable
cause analysis. This attempt to dilute the standard of probable cause
touches roots that run deep in the constitutional history of this coun
try, and requires extended discussion.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, had just presented
"persuasive arguments" against according an informant's veracity or
reliability and his basis of knowledge "independent status,"339 and
followed this by citing illustrative examples of the new totality-of
the-circumstances analysis, when suddenly, and quite unexpectedly,
he introduced a discussion of the meaning of probable cause. Here,
his choice of definitions was not simply intriguing; it bordered on the
Byzantine.
Justice Rehnquist looked back to Locke v. United States,340 de
cided by the Supreme Court in 18l3, to find a definition of probable
cause that would be appropriate for the 1983 totality-of-the-circum
stances analysis that was superseding the Aguilar-Spinelli rules. 341
Further, he insisted that the definition proposed by Chief Justice
Marshall, the author of Locke, had been made "in a closely related
337. See id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In a Draper-type
situation, the wealth of detail supplied by an informant, coupled with a substantial de
gree of corroboration developed by independent police work, will permit a magistrate to
reasonably infer that the information has been obtained in a reliable way, either as the
product of the informer's personal knowledge or by means of direct access to, or partici
pation in, the defendant's criminal activities. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18; id. at 426
(White, J., concurring); Sellers, 483 F.2d at 41.
338. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
339. Id.
340. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
341. 103 S. Ct. at 2330.
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context," presumably closely related to the Gates context. 342 Justice
Rehnquist then proceeded to quote Chief Justice Marshall's defini
tion: "[T]he term 'probable cause', according to its usual accepta
tion, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation
. . . . It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant
suspicion."343
Justice Rehnquist did not let matters lie here however, as he
seized upon a second opportunity to interject the concept of suspi
cion into probable cause analysis. The opportunity presented itself
within the following context.
Toward the end of the Gates opinion, Justice Rehnquist pro
ceeded to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to Detec
tive Mader's affidavit. During his discussion, he took the Illinois
Supreme Court to task for downplaying the significance of the police
corroboration of innocent activity on the part of the Gates'. After
noting that seemingly innocent activity can become suspicious in the
light of the informant's tip, and that "probable cause requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity," he observed: "In making a determination
of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular con
duct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches
to particular types of non-criminal acts."344
Again, the reader of Gates is confronted with a seemingly puz
zling tum of events. A close examination will reveal, however, that
Justice Rehnquist's choice of words was neither puzzling nor inex
plicable; that, in fact, his choice was quite deliberate, and made with
an eye to the future.
At this point, it is important to take stock of what was, and what
was not, at issue in Gates. The AgUilar-Spinelli rules were not cre
ated in a vacuum; they were not established to satisfy themselves, or
some hypothetical concept of probable cause, but rather to assist
magistrates in seeing that affidavits containing hearsay reports from
informants satisfied the constitutional requirement of probable
cause. The standard for this requirement has remained relatively
constant, at least since 1878, when it was explicated in Stacey v. Em
ery,345 and certainly since 1925, when it was refined in Carroll v.
United States .346 Thus, the issue before the Court in Gates was not
342. ld. (emphasis added).
343. ld. (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348) (emphasis added).
344. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13 (emphasis added).
345. 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
346. 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925).
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the standard for probable cause, but whether Detective Mader's affi
davit had in fact satisfied this standard. In short, the controversy
surrounding Aguilar-Spinelli, and culminating in Gales, had been
one of application to the standard of probable cause, and not one of
conceptualization of that cause. Therefore, the rejection of the Agui
lar-Spinelli analysis did not necessitate a reassessment, or a refine
ment, of the probable cause standard.
Since, however, the Gales majority saw fit to interject the stan
dard of probable cause into the controversy surrounding Aguilar
Spinelli, a review of its historical development and meaning IS m
order.
1.

Historical Development of the Probable Cause Standard

Although the practice of arresting a felon on probable suspicion
was known at English common law,347 the American experience has
. generally rejected any standard governing search-and-seizure proce
dures that does not satisfy the standard of probable cause. 348 The
347. See Mure v. Kaye, 128 Eng. Rep. 239, 242-43 (C.P. 1811) (Mansfield, c.J.); id.
at 243 (Heath, J.); id. at 243 (Chambre, J.); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *290; I J.
CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 13-15, 21, 22, 24, 31, 33-34 (1816); I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 579-80 (1778); 2 M. HALE, supra, at 108-10; 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 84-85 (1721); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 602 (1923)
(practice was regarded "as perfectly legal at the end of the seventeenth century"); 5 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra at 191; see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976)
(powell, J., concurring). Holdsworth traced this development to a new application of the
rules governing the hue and cry. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 603-04.
It must be noted, however, that the common law tended to employ the terms "prob
able cause," "supsicion," and "suspect" interchangeably. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note
33, at 27 n.34. For examples of this, see I J. CHITTY, supra, at 34 (reasonable suspicion of
guilt, or reasonable ground to suspect, defined as "such a probable cause as might induce
a discreet and impartial man to suspect the party to be guilty"); I M. HALE, supra, at 579
80 ("probable caufe of fufpicion").
348. The Supreme Court has sanctioned a reduced standard of an articulable and
objectively reasonable suspicion in only limited situations; and then, only where the law
enforcement need is special, and the intrusion is less invasive both as to scope and dura
tion than either a full-blown search or a full-scale arrest. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S.
Ct. 3469, 3480-82 (1983) (warrantless area search of passenger compartment for weapons
during an investigative stop of a motor vehicle); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
703-05 (1981) (temporary detention on less than probable cause of owner or occupant of
residence while the police are executing a search warrant for the premises); United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 421-22 (1981) (border paJrol search involving a brief
investigative stop of a motor vehicle on a particularized suspicion of being involved in
criminal activity); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82, 884 (1975)
(roving border patrols briefly stopping motor vehicles on reasonable suspicion for illegal
immigrants, where intrusion is modest, there is no search of vehicle or its occupants, and
visual inspection is limited to those parts of vehicle which can be viewed by anyone
standing alongside of it); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-12 (1977) (per
curiam) (limited search of driver of motor vehicle for weapons on basis of reasonable
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standard, in short, is the rule, not the exception, of fourth amend
ment jurisprudence. Consistent with this philosophy is the Supreme
Court's commitment to the requirement of probable cause, a "re
quirement. ..[which] has roots that are deep in our history."349
Thus, the Court has acknowledged that "[h]ostility to seizures based
on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment. ..."350
This hostility was reflected in early American cases, decided
shortly after the adoption of the fourth amendment, condemning the
practice of issuing warrants on suspicion.35I It was further rein
forced by Coke's concern for the security and privacy of the individ
ual in his home, if he were subjected to intrusions supported only by
suspicion,352 a fact that could not have been lost upon the framers of
the fourth amendment. 353 In a similar vein, Lord Camden, in Wilkes
v. WOOd,354 condemned the issuance of general warrants authorizing
the arrest of unnamed persons, connected with an alleged seditious
libel, and the seizure of their papers on suspicion. He stated:
belief that detainee is armed and dangerous); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48
(1972) (same as Mimms); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,24,27,29-31 (1968) (protective frisk
of detainee for weapons).
Although the Court has sanctioned investigative detentions on less than probable
cause, it has cautioned that they must be of limited duration, and last "no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325
(1983) (plurality opinion). Similarly, a further limitation requires that the investigative
methods employed by a law enforcement officer should be the "least intrusive means
reasonably available" to verify or dispel his suspicion in "a short period of time." Id.
The burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate that the detention was sufficiently lim
ited in duration and scope to satisty the requirements of an investigative seizure on rea
sonable suspicion. Id. at 1326.
What these cases point up is that the greater the intrusion into the individual's free
dom of movement, the stronger the justification for the restraint must be. United States
v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 520 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981). Thus, if
the suspect's liberty of movement is sufficiently curtailed to constitute an arrest under the
fourth amendment, then it must be supported by probable cause. Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-16 (1979).
349. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
350. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)(emphasis added).
351. See, e.g., Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38, 44 (Pa. 1810); if. Common
wealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 334-36 (1841) (upholding a warrant issued on the
basis of probable cause, and favorably comparing such a warrant to one issued on mere
suspicion).
352. E. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE 178 (1644); accord Entick v. Carrington, 19
Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1073-74 (C.P. 1765).
353. Lord Coke was "widely recognized by the American colonists 'as the greatest
authority of his time on the laws of England.'" Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 594
(1980) (quoting A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE; MAGNA CARTA AND CON
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 119 (1968».
354. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
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[These warrants amount to] a discretionary power given to mes
sengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If
such a power is truly invested in a Secretary of State, and he can
delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and prop
erty of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject. 355
Finally, the hostility to the issuance of warrants on suspicion re
ceived approbation in the "celebrated judgment"356 of Entick v. Car
rington ,357 where, in the process of condemning general warrants to
search on suspicion any home for evidence of seditious libel, Lord
Camden inquired that "if suspicion at large should be a ground of
search, . . . whose house would be safe?"358
Lord Camden's disapproving inquiry is not without signifi
cance. In Boyd v. United States ,359 which has been described by the
Supreme Court as "[t]he leading case on the subject of search and
seizure,"360 and by Justice Brandeis as "a case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States,"361 the
Court described the impact of Entick on the framers of the fourth
amendment in these terms:
It was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the

colonies as well as in the mother country. . .
As every American statesmen [sic], during our revolutionary
and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with
this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true
and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confi
dently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those
who framed the [f]ourth [a]mendment to the Constitution, and
were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .
Can we doubt that when the [f]ourth...[a]mendment[] to the
Constitution of the United States [was] penned and adopted, the
language of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true
doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing
the true criteria of the reasonable and "unreasonable" character of
355. Id. at 498 (emphasis added); see Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
728-29 (1961).
356. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
357. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
358. Id. at 1073-74 (emphasis added); see id at 1063-72.
359. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
360. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147; accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965).
361. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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[searches and seizures under the fourth amendment]?362
In England, as Wilkes and Entick demonstrated, the fear was of
the dreaded general warrant, which permitted the indiscriminate
search of private residences on mere suspicion. In the American col
onies, a similar fear existed of writs of assistance, which also permit
ted intrusions into the home on less than probable cause. 363 Thus it
was search on mere suspicion that facilitated the indiscriminate exe
cution of these feared processes, and created what amounted to little
more than roving commissions authorizing search and seizure on the
discretionary suspicion of petty officers. As history teaches, it was in
reaction to these practices, which encouraged arbitrary governmen
tal intrusions upon ''the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of
life,"364 that the fourth amendment was enacted. 36s
As this review has indicated, the choice of probable cause as the
standard by which privacy is reasonably invaded under the aegis of
the fourth amendment was no accident of history. It reflected the
American distaste for the excesses of the English crown in pursuing a
harsh policy of collecting taxes from the colonists. While the main
vice of the Crown's processes was the virtually unlimited authority
that they conferred upon the officers who were entrusted with their
execution, that very execution was facilitated by the reduced stan
dard of suspicion. Hence, the framers of the fourth amendment set
tled upon the higher standard of probable cause that would
reasonably accommodate the legitimate concerns of society for effec
tive law enforcement without jeopardizing the security and privacy
interests of the individual. The requirement of probable cause was
specifically mandated by the warrant clause of the fourth amend
ment, which established "the root principle of judicial superinten
362. 116 U.S. at 626-30.
363. For discussion of opposition by the American colonists to general writs of
assistance, issued on mere suspicion, see J. Frese, supra note 7, at 178-300.
364. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
365. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 583 & n.21 (1980); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-66 (1959), overruled on
other grounds, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1914); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 334-36
(1841); B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BILL OF RIGHTS 196 (1977); J. Frese, supra note 7, at 300; see a/so Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (because of historical
abuses, search warrants require great specificity, and may be issued only on adequate
grounds).
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dence of searches and seizures."366

2.

Conceptualization of the Respective Terms

Probable cause is a flexible concept which does not lend itself to
rigid analysis or precise definition.367 Its meaning, therefore, must
be found in the particular facts and circumstances of each case - in
short, within the context peculiar to each situation. 368 Within this
framework, the courts have striven for a definition that, while not
precise, does convey a discernible concept capable of reasonably
consistent application.
Under the fourth amendment, as its warrant clause commands,
probable cause is a prerequisite for the issuance of a valid war
rant. 369 Probable cause is established for a search warrant when the
facts and circumstances within an affiant's knowledge, and of which
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in them
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution and prudence to be
lieve that 370 items subject to seizure are presently upon a particular
person or situated within a specified place or thing;371 or, for an ar
rest warrant, a criminal offense has been, or is being, committed by a
particular individual.3 72 The standard thus required for the exist
ence of probable cause is nothing less than a reasonable belief.373
It is clear that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt 374 nor a
366. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 n.6 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
367. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-29; United States v. Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522, 1528
(lith Cir. 1983); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 46.
368. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 120.
369. See authorities cited supra note 18.
370. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); United States v.
Wylie, 705 F.2d 1388, 1392 (4th Cir. 1983); see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959).
371. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 46; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 129.
372. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States v. Wallraff,
705 F.2d 980, 990 (8th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. Perez, 357 Mass. 290, 300, 258 N.E.
2d 1,7 (1970); see United States v. Pepple, 707 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1983); J. LANDYN
SKI, supra note 33, at 46; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 129.
373. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91
(1964); Draper, 358 U.S. at 313; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161-62; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); United States v.
Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1Ol2, 1014
(10th Cir. 1982); Commonwealth v. Perez, 357 Mass. 290, 301, 258 N.E.2d I, 7 (1970).
374. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949); Commonwealth v. Pe
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prima Jacie showing is required. 375 More than "bare" suspicion,
since Chief Justice Marshall's time,376 or " 'reasonable cause to sus
pect,' "377 or even " 'strong reason to suspect,' "378 is required. Any
thing less than a reasonable belief, or any "relaxation of the
fundamental requirements of probable cause," would leave innocent
persons at the discretionary mercy of law enforcement officials. 379
Hence, a requirement of mere suspicion would severely undermine
the fundamental human right of freedom.380 This position is con
firmed by an analysis of the meaning (and import) of suspicion.
"Suspicion," which requires no real foundation for its existence,
is weaker than "belief,"381 which, of necessity, is based on at least
assumed facts. 382 Suspicion involves the act of imagining or appre
hending that something is so, without supporting proof or on only
slight evidence. 383 It is a concept that is well-known to the English
speaking countries, having been in existence at least since the four
teenth century, and is aroused to a substantial degree by conjec
ture. 384 Thus, suspicion is not synonymous with knowledge,385
rez, 357 Mass. 290, 301, 258 N.E.2d 1,7 (1970); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
584 (1971) (plurality opinion); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
375. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419; United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 990 (8th Cir.
1983).
A finding of probable cause may rest on evidence that is not legally competent in
criminal trial proceedings. Draper, 358 U.S. at 311-12; Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 172-76 (1949); see Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08; Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 269-72 (1960) (hearsay may be the basis for the issuance of a warrant, so long
as there is a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay).
376. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)(footnote omitted);see
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at
418-19.
377. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1977) (such cause to suspect
"imposes a less stringent requirement than that of 'probable cause'" to search or arrest
under the fourth amendment).
378. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959)(quoting Conner v. Common
wealth, 3 Binn. 38, 43 (Pa. 1810».
379. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)("[t)o allow less [than probable cause) would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice").
380. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Hogan & Snee, The Mc
Nabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47GEO. L.J. I, 22 (1958).
381. See Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430,
431 (1934); Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. 364,370 (1848); Gosser v. Gosser, 183 Pa. 499, 503, 38
A. 1014, 1015 (1898).
382. Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430, 431
(1934).
383. See People v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 1025, 149 Cal. Rptr. 349,
352 (1978); State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170, 175 (1964); 9 THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY (part 2) 260 (1919).
384. See 9 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 383, at 260.
385. Guarantee Co. orN. Am. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 80 F. 766, 784
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which may consist of credible information on material facts and cir
cumstances sufficient in content and quality to generate a reasonable
beliej386 that, in tum, will justify search-and-seizure activity by law
enforcement officers. 387 Accordingly, suspicion can never satisfy the
criterion for belief, namely, a conclusion or condition of mind which
results from a consideration of relevant facts and circumstances by
an individual of reasonable prudence and caution. 388
The major distinguishing feature, therefore, between suspicion
and belief lies in the respective foundations justifying each state of
mind or mental process. In the case of suspicion, little if any sup
porting basis is required. In the case of belief, the cornerstone of
probable cause analysis,389 a stronger foundation is required, one
that is secured by a factual predicate that warrants the requisite
mental conviction or conclusion. Any attempt to sanction search
and-seizure procedures governing the issuance of warrants on the
basis of suspicion absent a factual foundation would severely
threaten the continued vitality of the individual's right to personal
privacy and security free from arbitrary intrusion by government
agents. The relevant inquiry, in making determinations of probable
cause, should be the degree of factual belief, as distinguished from
conjecture, that is justified by particular types of innocent acts.
Justice Rehnquist cannot read the requirement of probable
cause out of the fourth amendment, but he can do the. next best
thing: change its meaning. This, it is submitted, is what he has at
(6th Cir. 1896), rev'd on other grounds, 173 U.S. 582 (1899); American Sur. Co. v. Pauly,
72 F. 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1896), affd, 170 U.S. 133 (1898); see Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial
Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 1963)(suspicion and knowledge are "poles
apart on a continuum of understanding").
386. See Sackett v. Farmers State Bank, 209 Iowa 487, 495, 228 N.W. 51, 54
. (1929); State v. Smith, 22 N.J. 59, 64-65, 123 A.2d 369, 372 (1956).
387. See State v. Godette, 188 N.C. 497, 503-04, 125 S.E. 24, 28 (1924).
388. Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430, 431
(1934). Stated differently, a belief consists of the mental acceptance of the existence of a
fact on the basis of evidence of which one is conscious. See Reed v. Fish Eng'g Corp., 76
N.M. 760, 769,418 P.2d 537, 544 (1966)(Oman, J., dissenting); I THE OXFORD DICTION
ARY (Part 2), at 782 (1888).
In Smith v. Bouchier, 93 Eng. Rep. 989 (C.P. 1734), the court held that an arrest
warrant, issued on the basis of an oath of suspicion by the plaintiff that he suspected that
the defendant would run away, could not be justified under a custom which sanctioned
the issuance of an arrest warrant on the basis of an oath of belief that the defendant
would Bee.ld. at 989. The court reasoned that to suspect something was not the same as
to believe it. Hence, a suspicion would not induce a belief and, therefore, was not a
sufficient basis for invoking the custom. Id.
389. See cases cited supra note 373.
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tempted to do in Gales. 390
It bears repeating, as well as emphasis, that the issue in Gales, as
it was also in both Aguilar and Spinelli, was not the standard of
probable cause, but, rather, whether the affidavit in question had sat
isfied that standard. Not surprisingly, therefore, neither party to the
controversy questioned the efficacy of the probable cause standard.
Rather, they joined issue on whether the information contained in
390. This attempt may already be bearing fruition. See United States v. Mendoza,
722 F.2d 96, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1983)(in assessing and finding probable cause, court ap
pears to have applied standard of reasonable suspicion espoused by Justice Rehnquist in
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13).
Gates does not represent Justice Rehnquist's initial flirtation with the principles of
suspicion while seeking an appropriate meaning for probable cause. In Texas v. Brown,
103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)(plurality opinion), Justice Rehnquist, while stating that the stan
dard of probable cause is " a flexible, common-sense standard ...[that) merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief...that certain items may be [subject to seizure; in short, a) 'practical, nontechni
cal' probability," analogized the process of assessing probable cause to the analysis of
" 'particularized suspicion.''' Id at 1543 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925); and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949». He quoted the
following passage from United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981):
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was articulated as such,practical people fornlU
lated. certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders are permitted to do the same - and so are law enforcement officers.
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement.
103 S. Ct. at 1543 (emphasis added).
Again, one is struck by the use of words such as "practical" and "common-sense" as
but code words for an overly-deferential attitude toward law enforcement practices in
derogation of the rights secured by the fourth amendment. It is also revealing, and quite
symptomatic of his insensitivity to fourth amendment values, that Justice Rehnquist
chose Cortez as an appropriate vehicle for favorable comparison with probable cause
analysis.
In Cortez, the Supreme Court was called upon to articulate a standard governing the
reasonableness of warrantless investigative stops by the Border Patrol of motor vehicles
on a particularized suspicion of being involved in criminal activity. In formulating the
appropriate standard, the Court noted "the enormous difficulties of patrolling a 2,000
mile open border," and that, "[o)f critical importance, [was the fact that) the officers
knew that the area [where the stop under review was made) was a crossing point for
illegal aliens." 449 U.S. at 418-19.
These factors, while relevant to the reasonableness of an investigative stop of a mo
tor vehicle at a border crossing, are singularly inappropriate for a critical assessment of
the factors relevant to a proper determination of the existence of probable cause. This is
especially true where warrants authorize forcible intrusions into the sanctity of the home,
an area of heightened privacy interests under the fourth amendment. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561,
565 (1976)(dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(en
banc)("[f]reedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the pri
vacy protection secured by the [f]ourth [a)mendment").
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Detective Mader's affidavit had imparted sufficient information to
the magistrate to satisfy that standard. Although the state had asked
the Court to repudiate the Aguilar-Spinelli rules, at no time did it
invite a reassessment of the meaning of probable cause.
Rather than accepting the issues as framed by the parties, Jus
tice Rehnquist seized upon the opportunity presented in Gates to call
into question the very concept of probable cause. By so doing, he
struck at the heart of the warrant machinery established by the
fourth amendment. If the concept of probable cause - the stan
dard by which privacy is reasonably invaded - is undercut, the very
privacy interests it was aimed at securing will be diminished and
proportionately weakened. Probable cause defines the criteria for
reasonable intrusions upon the individual's security and privacy.
When those criteria have been met, permission to breach the individ
ual's privacy will be forthcoming. If those criteria have not been
satisfied, permission will be withheld. That is precisely what Justice
Rehnquist is attempting to alter through his Gates analysis. He is
tipping the scales against the individual and in favor of the police by
reducing the criteria for authorizing intrusions into the sanctity of
the home and the security of the individual.

C. Customs and Maritime Searches and the Concept ofReasonable
Suspicion
As previously noted,391 Justice Rehnquist, in Gates, had in
formed the reader that Chief Justice Marshall's conception of prob
able cause in Locke had been made "in a closely related context,"
presumably closely related to the Gates context. 392 A close examina
tion will reveal, however, that the Locke context was anything but
closely related to Gates, or, for that matter, to the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment which governed Gates.
As background, the reader will recall that Marshall, in his
Locke opinion, had conceptualized probable cause in terms of "a
seizure made under circumstances which warrantsuspicion."393 Two
aspects of this concept are noteworthy. First, Marshall was defining
probable cause solely in terms of a seizure, rather than with refer
ence to both searches and seizures. Why, one may ask, did he con
sider it appropriate to limit his discussion to seizures, thereby
391. See supra text accompanying note 342.
392. 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (emphasis added).
393. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
notes 340-43.
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excluding searches?394 Second, Marshall introduced the concept of
suspicion into his analysis of probable cause. The question arises,
why did the premier Chief Justice of the Supreme Court conceptual
ize probable cause in terms of suspicion only a short time after the
adoption of the fourth amendment if, as the Court has reminded us,
"[h]ostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motiva
tion for the adoption of the [flourth [a]mendment[?]"395 The an
swers to these questions lie in the factual setting of Locke, which
will reveal that Marshall's choice of terms was not surprising.
Locke was a libel proceeding to forfeit a cargo of imported
goods seized for violation of the revenue laws. "It presented," as the
Supreme Court has noted, ''no question concerning the validity of a
warrant ."396 More fundamentally, however, the practice of sanc
tioning searches on suspicion for goods smuggled into the country in
violation of the revenue or tariff laws has "been sustained from the
earliest times," and was authorized as early as 1789. 397 Similarly, in
1790, the First Congress enacted a comprehensive statute authoriz
ing customs officers to board and search, without even articulable
suspicion, any vessel found within the nation's domestic waters. 398
These practices were affirmed in the revenue act of March 2, 1799,
which formed the statutory basis for the libel of condemnation filed
394. Although the standard of probable cause is the same for searches and
seizures, see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 485-86, it remains/actually noteworthy that Mar
shall referred only to seizures.
395. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)(emphasis added); see supra
text accompanying notes 347-66.
396. Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
397. ld See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §23, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789)(current
version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1462, 1467, 1496, 1499, 1582 (1982»(authorizing the
opening and examination, "on suspicion of fraud," of packages of goods imported into
the country);id § 24, 1 Stat. at 43 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 482,
1595(a)(1982»(authorizing searches of ships or vessels on "reason to suspect" that goods
subject to duty are concealed therein, and sanctioning the issuance of search warrants for
daytime searches of residences, stores, buildings, "or other place[s]" on "cause to sus
pect" the concealment therein of imported goods "subject to duty"). Under present law,
section 1595(a) requires the officer making a search of any dwellings, store or building to
"have cause to suspect the presence. . .of any merchandise upon which the duties have
not been paid. . . ." 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a)(1982); see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606,616-17 & n. 12 (1977); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-51; Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063,
1079-81 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The Massachusetts colony had conferred similar pow
ers on its local customs collector in the mid-seventeenth century. J. Frese, supra note 7,
at 127-28.
398. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164-65 (1790) (current version at
19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982»; see United States v. Villamonte-Mar.quez, 103 S. Ct. 2573,
2577-78 (1983).
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in Locke. 399
It is apparent, therefore, that Marshall was addressing the
meaning of probable cause within the context of the seizure of smug
gled goods or contraband. This is highlighted by the nature of the
proceeding before the Locke Court: a libel for the condemnation of
goods illegally imported into the country. It was confirmed by Mar
shall's use of the word "condemnation," when he observed that
probable cause "means less than evidence which would justify con
demnation ."400 Hence, Marshall was correct when he observed that
"in all cases of seizure [of smuggled goods]," the term probable
cause "has a fixed and well known meaning. It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion."401
An examination of the principal issue raised by the defendant in
Locke further reinforces this interpretation. The defendant claimed
that "just cause to suspect" that the goods seized had offended
against the law was not enough to require him to produce exculpa
tory evidence. "Guil~," he argued, "must be proved before the pre
399. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 67,68, I Stat. 627, 677-78 (1799) (current ver
sion at 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982»; see Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151.
The authority to conduct customs searches on less than probable cause has contin
ued to the present time. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2579
82 (1983); United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1550, 1552-56 (lith Cir. 1983); United
States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v.
Kenney, 601 F.2d 211, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Doe, 472
F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Glaziou, 402
F.2d 8, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); United States v. Burke,
540 F. Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (D.P.R. 1982), affd, 716 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1983); United
States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91 (D. Me. 1982), affd, 701 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1983) (per curiam); 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982); 19 U.S.c. §§ 482, 1581(a) (1982). In addi
tion, border searches may be conducted by customs officials without a warrant or prob
able cause, or even mere suspicion. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19
(1977); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54; Herrera, 711 F.2d at 1552 (dictum); see generally
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2579-82 (boarding by customs officials of vessel in
domestic waters providing ready access to open sea, without articulable suspicion of
wrongdoing, to conduct an examination of vessel's documents, does not offend the fourth
amendment). Such authority extends to documentary and safety inspection searches of
vessels on the high seas without any antecedent or particularized suspicion of wrongdo
ing. Burke, 716 F.2d at 937; United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504-06 (lith
Cir. 1983); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887
(1980); see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1081-82, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc). The authority further extends to searches of vessels on the high seas on reason
able and articulable grounds for suspecting that they are engaged in criminal activity.
United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982);
Burke, 540 F. Supp. at 1287; see Herrera, 711 F.2d at 1550, 1552-56 (applying same
standard to customs searches of non-private areas of vessels conducted in customs, as
distinguished from international, waters); Williams, 617 F .2d at 1086-88.
400. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348 (emphasis added).
401. Id.
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sumption of innocence could be removed" from the case.402 With
this, the Court disagreed. 403
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the statute governing these
proceedings required that the burden of proof would be on anyone
claiming the property previously seized for violation of the revenue
laws, provided probable cause had been established" 'for such pros
ecution."404 The previous reference to burden of proof ("the onus
probandi") was contained in a statutory clause which stated that "in
actions, suits or informations to be brought, where any seizure shall
be made pursuant to this act," if the property seized was "claimed by
any person, in every such case [the burden of proof would be on]
such claimant."405 The subsequent reference to burden of proof,
again being placed on "the claimant," came at the end of section 71
of the Act of March 2, 1799, and contained a provision that qualified
the previous general applicability of "the onus probandi" to all "such
claimant[s]."406 This provision must have referred to "the onus pro
bandi" applicable to "actions, suits or informations to be brought,
where any seizure shall be made pursuant to this act ."407 These are
the only references to "the onus probandi" contained in section 71,
and in each instance it has specific applicability to a "claimant" of
the property previously seized "pursuant to this act. "408 Therefore,
the provision, in limiting the applicability of "the onus probandi," or
burden of proof, to the claimant "only where probable cause is
shown for such prosecution," can mean "only where probable cause
is shown for such ['actions, suits or informations to be brought,
where any seizure shall be made pursuant to this act']."409
In sum, when Marshall characterized probable cause as having
"a fixed and well known meaning[, which] imports a seizure made
under circumstances which warrant suspicion,"41o he clearly had in
mind its "meaning" in the law governing searches for goods smug
gled into the country in violation of the revenue or tariff laws. It is
only in this limited area of the law that probable cause has come to
mean "circumstances which warrant suspicion."411
402. ld.
403. ld.
404. ld. (quoting Act of March 2,1799, ch. 22 § 71,1 Stat. 627, 678 (1799».
405. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627, 678 (1799) (repealed).
406. ld.
407. ld. (emphasis added).
408. ld.
409. ld.
410. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) al 348.
411. The defendant-claimant in Locke had argued that "[g]uilt. ..must be proved
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The justification for customs and border searches or seizures on
less than probable cause is based on the inherent authority of the
sovereign "to protect its territorial integrity,"412 and to prevent
smuggling, as well as to prevent prohibited articles from entering the
country.413 Similarly, the need for a warrant, or for probable cause,
prior to the boarding of a ship by government agents, is excused by
the circumstances and exigencies of the maritime setting, which af
ford individuals on a vessel a reduced expectation of privacy.414
Thus, factual and circumstantial distinctions between maritime and
land searches415 determine their respective reasonableness. 416 This,
of course, is but a corollary of the precept that the reasonableness of
a particular search or seizure depends upon the peculiar facts and
circumstances giving rise to its occurrence - the "total atmosphere
of the case."417
It is submitted, however, that the reduced, and even, in some
instances, nonexistent standard of cause that is appropriate for cus
toms and border s~arches is singularly inappropriate for land
searches, and, in particular, for those searches conducted in the
home,418 where privacy interests (and concerns) are most pro
nounced,419 or on other fixed premises.420 While any search or
before the presumption of innocence [could) be removed" from the case. II U.S. (7
Cranch) at 348. Marshall rejected this claim by noting that the issue of burden of proof
was governed by the applicable statute, and implicitly determining that probable cause
had to be assessed within the context of the nature of the prosecution. See id. Thus, he
rejected the defendant's argument that the standard required was that of prima facie
evidence, and applied the "fixed and well known meaning," in the law governing contra
band seized for violation of the revenue or tariff statutes, of "circumstances which war
rant suspicion." Id.
412. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979); see United States v. Ram
sey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-20 (1977); Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth
Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725, 731-32 (1980).
413. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973).
414. United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1552 (lith Cir. 1983) (probable cause
not required); United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (lst Cir. 1982) (warrant not re
quired); see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
415. "Land searches" means those searches conducted in the interior of the coun
try, away from the border or its functional equivalent.
416. See United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1551 (lith Cir. 1983).
417. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,66 (1950); accord, Chimel v. Cali
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
418. Part of the search activity in Gates consisted of a search of the defendant's
residence. 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
419. See Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1984) (plurality opinion); Pay
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (en banc).
420. Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805-07 (1982) (searches of vessels or
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seizure activity necessarily involves some degree of intrusiveness and
disruption, not to mention its traumatic impact upon one's state of
mind, the degree of intrusion upon privacy that may be occasioned
by a customs or border search is hardly comparable to, and is, in
fact, significantly different from, the severe interference with privacy
resulting from a search of a home or other fixed premises. 421 In the
latter setting, the sharply defined privacy and security interests of the
motor boats are not comparable to searches of residences or other fixed premises); United
States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (import restric
tions an4 searches at the nation's borders rest on different considerations and different
rules of constitutional law "from domestic regulations"); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality opinion) (port-of-entry is not a traveler's
home; individual's right to be let alone does not exempt his luggage from customs search,
which is "an old practice. . .intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the
country"); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 45-47 (customs agents seeking warrants for private
residences must satisfy probable cause requirements of fourth amendment, mere affirm
ance of suspicion or belief, without disclosure of supporting allegations of fact, not suffi
cient; Court implicitly rejected cause-to-suspect standard for issuance of warrants under
fourth amendment); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-53 (same as Ross); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1885) (same as Ross); United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46,53 (1st
Cir. 1982) (circumstances and exigencies of maritime setting afford people on a vessel a
lesser expectation of privacy than in their homes); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (there are substantial differences between
maritime searches and searches of buildings and vehicles on land); United States v.
Steinkoenig, 487 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1973) (statute authorizing border searches will
not sanction warrantless searches of a residence); United States v. Burke, 540 F. Supp.
1282, 1286 (D.P.R. 1982) (same as Ross and Green), aJrd, 716 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1983).
In Nathanson, the Third Circuit acknowledged that had the warrant in question
been issued under authority of the prohibition laws (warrant had been issued for the
seizure of liquor smuggled into the country), it would have been invalid, "since the affi
davit was merely based upon cause to suspect and suspicion." Nathanson v. United
States, 63 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). The court sustained the
warrant, however, under the tariff and customs laws, arguing that the government's pecu
niary interest in the smuggled goods was sufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant,
and that the search warrant, based on a sworn complaint phrased almost in the language
of section 595 of the Tariff Act of 1930 did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights. fd. at 939; see Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 595(a), 46 Stat. 752 (current version
at 19 U.S.c. § 1595(a) (1982».
To the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit had "acted upon an erroneous view." 290
U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). The Court perceived the issue to be whether the warrant
was supported by probable cause, and concluded that it was not. 290 U.S. at 46-47. It
would appear, therefore, that the Court implicitly rejected the cause-to-suspect standard
for probable cause. For further discussion of Nathanson, see supra text accompanying
notes 39-45.
421. Cf, United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the [f1ourth [a)mendment is
directed"); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (fourth
amendment protects individual's interest in peace and quiet by prohibiting searches that
result in the physical disruption or ransacking of people's households).
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individual require, as does the fourth amendment, the higher stan
dard of probable cause.
By contrast, customs and border searches protect an important
national interest- the prevention of smuggling. Without the author
ity to conduct such searches on less than probable cause, the govern
ment would be virtually powerless to effectively police the nation's
frontiers and prevent smuggling activities, in particular, the difficul
ties posed by combating widespread drug smuggling operations
would increase. Moreover, people crossing into the nation's territo
rial waters know that they are likely to be searched, due to the exten
sive governmental regulation of maritime and boating operations,
thereby significantly reducing their reasonable expectations of pri
vacy. Similarly, vessels are searched solely because they belong to a
morally neutral class. These factors combine to suggest that customs
searches on less than probable cause satisfy the requirement of rea
sonableness under the fourth amendment. 422
The abuses attendant upon searches on suspicion were upper
most in the minds of the framers of the fourth amendment when
they insisted upon the requirement of probable cause. This choice
was' not by accident. It was made with the knowledge and foresight,
and with the intent that the integrity of the individual would better
be served and preserved by this higher standard. 423 The selection of
the Constitution as the repository for this standard was also without
accident. In this way did the framers seek to preserve individual
rights from the vicissitudes and pressures of political and judicial
change. 424 Thus, any attempt to analogize the search of a person, his
home, his papers, and his effects, conducted in the interior of the
nation, to customs, maritime, or border searches is devoid of histori
cal and analytical merit and misconceives the very purpose of the
fourth amendment.
The amendment was designed to protect the individual from ar
bitrary and unwarranted intrusions upon his legitimate expectations
of privacy, and thereby sought to secure him in his "personl],
housel], papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
422. See United States v. Williams, 617 E2d 1063, 1085-88 (5th Cir, 1980) (en
bane); see also id. at 1087-88.
423. See JUpra text accompanying notes 347-66.
424. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No, 78, at 491-92 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(constitutional requirement of lifetime tenure for judicial officers will secure the indepen
dence of the judiciary against legislative encroachments, and protect the rights of the
individual from majoritarian excesses).
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seizures."42s It was designed, in short, to protect people, not places,
or papers, or effects.426 Note the very language of the amendment:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ."427
Under the constitutional command, it was the people, and only
the people, who were endowed with the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A search or seizure is reasonable
or unreasonable, generally not because of the nature of what it seeks,
but because of its fidelity or lack of fidelity to the requirements of the
fourth amendment. Therefore, the attempt by Justice Rehnquist to
characterize the Locke setting as "a closely related context"428 to the
factual setting of Gates was both factually and jurisprudentially in
accurate. 429 The only relation between the two cases was that the
quarry in each was contraband. But, as fourth amendment jurispru
dence teaches, it is not the nature of the quest but rather an assess
ment of both the invasion of the individual's privacy interests and
the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests" through effec
tive law enforcement that determines the standard of reasonableness
applicable to search-and-seizure practices. 43o Thus, a particular
search or seizure may be permissible in one factual setting while im
permissible in another setting, even though what is sought is the
same in each instance. 431 In delineating the constitutional safe
guards applicable in particular contexts, a court should weigh the
public interest against the privacy and security interests of the indi
vidual under the fourth amendment. 432
Although the public interest in effective law enforcement is al
ways a weighty consideration in formulating a standard of reasona
bleness applicable in particular contexts, there are certain settings
where the fourth amendment interests of the individual are pre-emi
nent. For example, a warrantless search or seizure within the home is
425. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
426. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967).
427. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
428. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2330.
429. Cf. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973) (import restrictions and searches at the nation's borders rest on different consider
ations and different rules of constitutuionallaw "from domestic regulations").
430. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted); see United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
431. See cases cited supra note 420.
432. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
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"presumptively unreasonable."433 Conversely, objects subject to
seizure, such as weapons or contraband, that are found in a public
place may be lawfully seized by government agents without a war
rant. 434 And, the justifications for customs and border searches on
less than probable cause are the compelling need and the inherent
authority of the sovereign to protect its territorial integrity, and to
prevent smuggling, as well as to prevent prohibited articles from en
tering the country.435 Similarly, the circumstances and exigencies of
the maritime setting, which afford individuals on a vessel a reduced
expectation of privacy, will excuse the need for a warrant, or for
probable cause, prior to the boarding of a ship by agents of the gov
ernment. 436 In sum, then, the scope of a constitutional safeguard will
be defined by its purpose within a particular context.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist ignored "traditional doctrine"437 by
quoting Locke as implicit precedent for searches conducted in the
interior of the country, and, in particular, for residential searches,
such as took place in Gates. 438 That doctrine requires that the prece
dential value of a decision should be limited to the immediate con
fines of the decision's factual setting. This means that language
appearing in a particular decision is to be read in light of the deci
sion's factual setting439 and should not be interpreted as a decision
upon, or precedent for, an issue which the facts of the case do not
present.440 Therefore, it is submitted that Locke had no precedential
value for Gates, and should not have been accorded any such treat
ment by Justice Rehnquist.
D. The Impact
l.

of Gates on State Prosecutions

Federalism and the Standard of Protection Under State
Law

One of the great strengths of the American constitutional
scheme is its diversity, which has permitted the development of a
433. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (footnote omitted).
434. Id. at 586-87 (dictum).
435. See authorities cited supra notes 412-13.
436. See cases cited supra note 414.
437. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 853 (6th Cir. 1975).
438. 103 S. Ct. at 2330.
439. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944); Satty v. Nashville
Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850,853 (6th Cir. 1975); accord, Communications Workers of Am. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds,
429 U.s. 1033 (1977); see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400. (1821).
440. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 231 (1968); accord, United
Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 404 (1965).
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system of shared responsibility between the national government
and the several states. Not only does it provide for a series of checks
and balances, but also it permits independent state sovereigns to ex
ist within a federal framework of government. Under the balances
of federalism, the separate states of the Union possess all of the pow
ers of sovereignty that are not in confiict with the powers delegated
by the United States Constitution to the federal government or pro
hibited by that charter to the states.441
This concept of federalism envisions a constitutional system
providing for the exercise of both concurrent and exclusive powers
by the federal government and by the states. Thus, pursuant to the
principle of dual sovereignty, the national government remains
supreme within the federal sphere, while each state retains its in
dependent sovereignty and remains supreme within its own terri
tory,442 subject to limited federal jurisdiction. In the criminal sphere,
for example, the state, while pursuing and vindicating its separate
governmental interests, may not interpret rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution more restrictively than the Supreme
Court has interpreted them.443
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio ,444 a majority of the states had not devel
oped a substantial body of law governing search-and-seizure prac
tices by law enforcement officers. With the advent of Mapp, and its
insistence upon extending the federal exclusionary rule, announced
in Weeks v. United States, 445 to state prosecutions,446 the state courts
were confronted with the prospect of having to decide large numbers
of complaints about the search-and-seizure practices of their police
officers without a well-developed body of independent jurisprudence
defining and governing the requirements of reasonableness under
their own constitutions. The result was, as might be expected, an
441. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1943); 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.1, at 4-5 (1969 & Supp. 1983).
442. See 2 C. ANTiEAU, supra note 441, § 10.1, at 4-5; R. TRESOLINl, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90-92 (1959). The principle of dual sovereignty is "inherent in
odr federal system." Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 (1977) (per curiam).
443. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 n.4 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 34 (1963).
A further restriction upon the power of the states arises where there exists an actual
confiict between federal and state law, or where the federal government has preempted or
occupied the field. In these situations, federal law is supreme. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23 through 6-30 (1978).
444. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
445. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court in Weeks was careful to exclude the states
and their officials from its precept. Id. at 398.
446. 367 U.S. at 655-56.

402

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:331

inordinate reliance by state courts upon federal precedents, in partic
ular the decisions of the Supreme Court.447
These Court pronouncements, however, and in particular those
ofthe Warren Court, were far more expansive of fourth amendment
protections than what most state tribunals, with their tradition of ad
mitting all relevant evidence no matter how obtained, were prepared
to adopt on their own initiative. In seeking guidance from the na
tion's highest court, some state tribunals may well have been con
fused as to the duty of the Supreme Court in interpreting the
commands of the federal Constitution. That duty, quite simply, re
quires the Court to seek out and define only minimum standards of
protection for individual rights. 448 Consequently, the federal Consti
tution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, establishes minimum
standards, and reserves to the states the right to impose higher stan
dards on law enforcement practices pursuant to their own
constitutions.
While pronouncements of the Supreme Court are entitled to re
spectful consideration, state courts retain their freedom of choice as
to whether, under their respective constitutions, they should comport
their decisions with federal law. In short, while this decision remains
one of choice, it may not be compelled. 449 Thus, the states are not
precluded from imposing, as a matter of state law, higher standards
on searches and seizures than are required by the fourth amend
ment. 4SO And, a number of states have elected to do SO.4SI
447. Cf Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1370 (1982) (state courts usually interpret state constitutional
protections exactly as the Supreme Court has interpreted corresponding federal
guarantees).
448. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299, 300 (1982); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528,545,531 P.2d 1099, 11I0, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,326 (1975) (en banc); State v. Benoit,
417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 23:6, at 655-56.
449. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 552, 531 P.2d 1099, l1I2, 11I4
15,119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328,330-31 (1975) (en banc).
450. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (dictum); see Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 & n.4 (1975); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (dictum);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-504 (1977); see also Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
451. Illustrative of this approach are: Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 362-63
(Alaska 1983) (refusing to follow restrictions on standing to assert the violation of a co
defendant's fourth amendment rights imposed in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969»; People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1I10-15, 119
Cal. Rptr. 315, 326-31 (1975) (en banc) (rejecting the standard governing the right to
search incident to custodial arrest announced in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973»; People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140-44 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (disavowing the
analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that the installation and use of a pen
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This result is not surprising. Not only were state constitutions
intended to be documents of independent force and vitality, but also
their historic roots reveal that the Bill of Rights was itself drafted on
the basis of the corresponding provisions of the first state constitu
tions. 452 Thus, for example, protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which later ripened into the fourth amend
ment, had been embodied in all of those state constitutions adopted
prior to 1789 that contained a separate bill of rights. 453
Although the United States Constitution was designed to secure
the sovereign integrity and independence of states against the poten
tial abuses of a centralized government, the state charters were con
ceived as the first line of protection of individual rights against the
excesses of local authorities. This dual sovereignty reflects a basic
principle of federalism: that this nation as a whole is composed of
register, on telephone company property, does not constitute a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 564-66, 227 N.W.2d 511,
514-15 (en banc), cerro denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975) (declining to follow United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion), which upheld the right of one party to a
telephone conversation to consent to eavesdropping on the conversation); State v. Ball,
34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2272, 2273 (N.H. Dec. 12, 1983) (adopting a stricter standard
governing the application of the plain view doctrine than that articulated in Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion»; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54,
346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (refusing to follow Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), regarding consent searches); People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 312, 313-14, 457
N.E.2d 723, 724-25, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618,619,620 (1983) (employing a stricter standard for
searches incident to arrest than explicated in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981»;
Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466-69 (Pa. 1983) (declining to adopt the analysis
in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), abolishing automatic standing to sup
press in possessory-offense cases); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899-901 (R.I. 1980) (re
jecting the logic of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), regarding the warrantless
investigatory search of a motor vecicle stopped and seized on the highway and removed
to a police station); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (S.D. 1976) (declining to
follow South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), regarding inventory searches of
impounded motor vehicles); State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 1242-43, 1247-48 (Wash.
1983) (en banc) (rejecting the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as refined
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and the search-incident-to-arrest rule de
veloped in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981»; see State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741,
653 P.2d 942, 947, 950-52 (1982) (en banc) (endorsing right to impose stricter standards
on searches and seizures under state constitution than are required by federal Constitu
tion, and creating such standards for searches incident to valid arrests).
452. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, liB, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975) (en banc); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, - n.13, 653 P.2d 942, 950
n.13 (1982) (en banc); see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1973); B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 365, at 86-90; see also A. HOWARD, supra note 353, at 182-83, 205
15, 231-40 (incorporation by state constitutions of many of the "rights of Englishmen"
led to adoption of Bill of Rights; American constitutional law, as reflected in the state
constitutions and the Bill of Rights, owes its origin to Magna Carta).
453. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, liB, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315,329 (1975) (en banc); see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 365, at 86-90.
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distinct political and geographic entities, bound together by a funda
mental federal law, but remaining, nevertheless, independently re
sponsible for safeguarding the rights of their respective citizens. 454
2.

A Call to the States to Reject the Implications of Gates
and its Lower Standard

After reading the majority opinion in Gates, one is left with the
uneasy (one might even say, disturbing) impression that the real cul
prit, in Justice Rehnquist's cast of characters, is not Aguilar-Spinelli
or the standard for probable cause, or even the exclusionary rule, but
rather, the fourth amendment itself; that to him, it is "a kind of nui
sance, a serious impediment in the war against crime,"455 and func
tions as a refuge for the guilty and the wrongdoers of American
society. If this impression is accurate, then Justice Rehnquist mis
construes the amendment's purpose and has seriously misread its
history.
In a sense, the fourth amendment does operate to protect the
guilty; for when a criminal accused moves to suppress competent
and relevant evidence, obtained in violation of his rights under the
amendment, he is implicitly acknowledging that the evidence he is
seeking to exclude from his trial is in fact inculpatory to him.456 But
the fourth amendment protects more than just the guilty. It protects
all persons - the innocent and the guilty - who have been sub
jected to intrusions by means of unreasonable searches and seizures
upon their security and legitimate expectations of privacy. Toward
that end, it must be construed liberally to safeguard these precious
rights. 457 Justice Butler put the proposition in these terms: "The
Amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of
454. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1975) (en banc); see State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.1. 1980).
For further discussion of this issue, see Brennan, supra note 450; Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Righls in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873
(1976); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy
Through State Law, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981); Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Developments in the Law, supra
note 447; Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather than
Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1978).
455. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
456. It would be a rare defendant, indeed, who would move to exclude exculpatory
evidence.
457. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391
92 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). See generally Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Devicefor Protecling the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).
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vigilencefor its eff"ective enforcement lest there shall be impairment of
the rights for the protection of which it was adopted."458
There is good reason for this broad protection. As history
teaches, arbitrary governments frequently resort to oppressive
search-and-seizure practices to further the ends of tyranny at the ex
pense of fundamental principles of liberty.459 Moreover, such prac
tices are not unfamiliar to this country, and have been described in
stark terms by Justice Jackson:
[T]he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the
most difficult to protect. Since the [law enforcement] officers are
themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of
court.
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the atten
tion of the courts, and then only those where the search and
seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least
sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing
incriminating, this invasion of the personal1iberty of the innocent
too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am con
vinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and
automobiles of innocent people which tum up nothing incriminat
ing,. in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing,
and about which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only
indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence ob
tained against those who frequently are guilty.46O

As this passage demonstrates, the fourth amendment is not self
executing and of necessity must rely upon the collective good judg
ment of the courts to secure, for the overwhelming majority of inno
cent citizens of this country, protection from arbitrary invasions of
their peace and security by government agents. Thus, the courts
must remain faithful to the great and enduring principles embodied
in the fundamental law of the Land by insisting that the police com
ply with the commands of the amendment. 461 The vehicle adopted
for securing this compliance is the exclusion of evidence obtained in
458. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (emphasis
added).
459. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
460. Id. at 181 (emphasis added); see Loewy, supra note 457, at 1269 (since pri
mary purpose of fourth amendment ought to be protection of the innocent, the Supreme
Court's principal focus should be on deterrent value of the exclusionary rule).
461. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914).
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violation of the constitutional mandate,462 even if on occasion it re
sults, as Justice Jackson acknowledged, in the acquittal of guilty
persons. 463
Who is to say that this is too high a price to pay, when one
considers the genesis of the fourth amendment? Men, such as John
Adams, William Henry Drayton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
George Mason, James Otis, and Oxenbridge Thacher, were not act
ing as criminals and wrongdoers when they cried out against the
abuses of the English crown. It was the outcry against these abuses
that led to the Declaration of Independence and to the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. These men were all too familiar with the
excesses employed by the monarchy, through the the dreaded and
despised writs of assistance, not to know that the security and pri
vacy of innocent persons were frequently invaded without just cause.
Their knowledge was reflected in the fourth amendment, in its com
mand against unreasonable searches and seizures, and in its insis
tence that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."464 By
means of these protections, the innocent would be secure from indis
criminate general searches based only on suspicion, which, "[s]ince
before the creation of our government, ... have been deemed ob
noxious to fundamental principles of liberty."465 It is not surprising,
therefore, that Justice Jackson protested that fourth amendment pro
tections "are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog
of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart."466
Justice Rehnquist's vision of the fourth amendment is both nar
row and insensitive to the great principles of individual1iberty upon
which the Bill of Rights is founded. There is, however, another vi
sion of the fourth amendment, one that rejects Justice Rehnquist's
interpretation. This view teaches that there is a spiritual underpin
462. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at
655-57 (exclusionary rule assures that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence"; without the rule, the fourth amendment would be reduced to '''a form of
words"'); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18, 222-24 (1960).
463. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (while the rule of exclusion may result in the free
ing of a criminal, "it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than. . .its disregard of the charter of its own existence").
464. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
465. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
466. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ning to the fourth amendment - the belief that equates the value of
the privacy and sanctity of person and home, supplemented by con
stitutional protection against overreaching government, with the
very value of human dignity itself. This belief, in sum, views the
amendment as a fundamental restraint upon police conduct so as to
preserve individual privacy and security except in cases of compel
ling necessity, and then only under strict procedural safeguards. 467
Justice Brandeis stated this philosophy most cogently as "the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."468 Thus, the principle function of the
fourth amendment is to preserve "the privacy of a free people living
free lives"469 from indiscriminate search-and-seizure practices by
law enforcement officers.
This clash of philosophies was most evident in Gates. The par
ticular setting for this disagreement was the facial sufficiency of a
supporting affidavit for a warrant based on hearsay evidence con
tained in an anonymous informant's tip. The issue raised, however,
far transcended the significance of its factual context, for what ulti
mately was implicated in Gates was the continued vitality of the war
rant machinery erected by the fourth amendment.
The great, and enduring, purpose of the warrant requirement is
to interPose a neutral and detached magistrate between the citizen
and the police, so that an objective mind might assess the need of
government agents to invade the individual's privacy in order to en
force the law. In this way, the founders of our constitutional system
of government believed that the individual's right to privacy and so
ciety'S interest in reasonable security and freedom from official sur
veillance could best be preserved and accomodated. Obviously,
therefore, the role of the magistrate is central to this constitutional
scheme, for he acts as a brake on the arbitrary practices of unscrupu
lous law enforcement officers, thereby severely limiting the right of
an officer to thrust himself into a home. 47o At the core of this role is
the magistrate's independence, for without this structural and mental
integrity, all semblance of objectivity would quickly vanish, and the
magistrate would become a deferential and pliable agent of the po
lice. It is submitted that this is exactly the ,role that Justice Rehn
467. J. LANDYNSKl, supra note 33, at 47.
468. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
469. Amsterdam, supra note II, at 407.
470. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1932); United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir. 1983).
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quist's opinion in Gates envisions for the magistrate- one of
subservience to law enforcement officers and their informants, one of
deference to their superior knowledge and expertise in combating
and rooting out crime. And, it is further submitted, it is precisely this
ideology that the founders of this nation most abhorred and feared
and sought to neutralize, not only by a system of checks and bal
ances but also by means of the Bill of Rights, which was conceived
as a collective limitation upon the exercise of power by government.
The framers of the fourth amendment were not ignorant men. They
did not bring second-class minds to the task of erecting an enduring
charter of this nation's existence. Surely they must have been aware
of the temptation to use the awesome power of government in fur
therance of some "noble" cause, passionately perceived and warmly
embraced by a current majority of the community. But just as surely,
they saw the dangers of such a result, for once government is free of
constitutional restraints and let loose on society, that society will be
quickly cowed and crushed in spirit. Its members will become terror
ized, their human personality diminished, and their dignity and self
reliance destroyed. It is little wonder, therefore, that unrestricted
search-and-seizure practices have become, in the words of Justice
Jackson, "one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal
of every arbitrary government."471
Gates struck at the integrity and independence of the magis
trate. It did this by downgrading the magistrate's central role in
making determinations of probable cause and by encouraging the
magistrate to abdicate his responsibility in the probable-cause pro
cess by deferring to the judgments of police officers and their infor
mants in the name of efficient law enforcement and common sense.
A clue to Justice Rehnquist's thinking appeared when he im
plicitly admonished magistrates not to insist upon a thorough detail
ing of the basis of knowledge of an informant known for his
"unusual reliability."472 The magistrate, under the new totality-of
the-circumstances approach touted in Gates, is asked to trust to the
informer's current reliability primarily, if not exclusive]y, on the ba
sis of his past reliability. But, as Justice White was quick to point
out, the past reliability of an informant is no more a barometer of
current probable cause than is the previous trustworthiness of an ex

471.
472.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
103 S. Ct. at 2329.
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perienced and honest law enforcement officer.473
Justice Rehnquist's approach differs from that of Justice White
and of Aguilar-Spinelli by asking the magistrate to place undue em
phasis upon the prior reliability of an informer in determining cur
rent probable cause. Put another way, he is asking the magistrate to
trust the source of the information, primarily on the basis of proven
reliability, and if it satisfies the affiant-police officer, it will be suffi
cient for the magistrate to find probable cause. The argument ap
pears to be that the collective knowledge and expertise of law
enforcement officers and their informants in combating crime are far
superior and more trustworthy than that of mere magistrates. In this
way, the integrity of the role of an independent judiciary in probable
cause determinations and the warrant process will have been com
promised, and the objective analysis required of a truly independent
judicial officer will have been effectively subverted.
Justice Brennan caught the drift of Justice Rehnquist's argu
ment when he observed, with perception, that "[w]ords such as 'prac
tical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's
opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude to
wards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
[f]ourth [aJmendment."474 It was never the intent of the framers of
the amendment, or of the Supreme Court itself, as reflected in its
prior decisions, that practicality, common sense, and effective law
enforcement were to take precedence per se over rights secured by
the fourth amendment. 475 The states should emphatically reject any
such approach under their respective constitutions. They should in
sist, at a minimum, that, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a war
rant, a substantial showing of facts must be made from which an
inference may be reasonably drawn that the informer is a credible
person and that his information was obtained or gathered in a relia
ble way. Any standard that does not require such a showing will
result in an impairment of the rights secured by the fourth amend
473. £d. at 2350 (White, J., concurring); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 424-25 (White, J.,
concurring).
474. 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For an example of Gales' implicit endorsement of the substantial, if not, in fact,
primary role of law enforcement expertise in assessments of probable cause, and its im
pact upon an evaluation of innocent-appearing activity, see United States v. Mendoza,
722 F.2d 96, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1983).
475. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("mere fact that law
enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
[flourth [a)mendment").
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ment. 476 Making it easier to obtain a warrant may simplify and ex
pedite the investigation of crime, but it is not the way for
constitutional government to go, and Justice Stewart has told us
why: "[T]he [flourth [a]mendment reflects the view of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum sim
plicity [and expediency] in enforcement of the criminallaw."477
Ultimately, the focus of judicial inquiry should not be on such
subjective factors as the expertise and wisdom of law enforcement
officers and their informers, common sense, practicality, and efficient
and simplified law enforcement, but rather on an objective analysis
of the information contained in the supporting affidavit so as to
make a proper determination of probable cause. In this way, the
magistrate will be effectively discharging his duty of determining
whether the constitutional rights of the individual who is subject to
the warrant will be violated if the warrant is issued. Justice Rehn
quist was correct when he implied that there is no magic formula for
accomplishing this.478 Certainly, as he suggested, there is an interre
lationship between the Aguilar-Spinelli basis-of-knowledge and ve
racity prongs. 479 Therefore, there is merit to the argument that the
Aguilar-Spinelli rules were not the last word on the troublesome sub
ject of properly assessing the probable cause sufficiency of infor
mants' tips, and that a rigid application of this analysis could
seriously hamper effective law enforcement without materially in
creasing constitutional protections. 48o But after this much is ac
knowledged, the fact remains that the magistrate must still be
476. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). This
may be done, for example, by means of the informant's personal observation of the infor
mation imparted in his report, or a showing that the informer's hearsay came from one of
the actors in the crime in the nature of an admission against penal interest, or self-verify
ing detail in the tip sufficient to infer an adequate basis of knowledge, or substantial
corroboration or verification of the report's contents.
One court has attempted to put a limiting construction on Gates: Commonwealth v.
Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 568-74,458 N.E.2d 717, 720-24 (1983). The problem with any such
assessment, however, is that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its own pronounce
ments. Moreover, one may assume that the Court chooses the language contained in its
rulings with care. Thus, interpreting a Supreme Court decision by choosing to ignore part
of the language contained in that decision, as the Upton court did, could prove to be of
dubious, as well as of limited, precedential value. The better approach, it is submitted, is
for a state court to recognize and appreciate the full implications of Gates, and to reject
it under the authority of the applicable state constitution.
477. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
478. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-29.
479. See id. at 2329.
480. See id. at 2330-32; id at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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presented with a showing of facts that is sufficient for him to reason
ably infer that the informer is a credible person who gathered his
information in a reliable way. Otherwise, warrants will issue "on
loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact,"481 and will expose the indi
vidual and his home to search on mere suspicion.
Similarly, the states should emphatically reject any suggestion
of Justice Rehnquist's that probable cause should be conceptualized
in terms of suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. While retaining its
label, Justice Rehnquist has attempted to change the meaning of
probable cause. By so doing, he has embarked on a path that runs
counter to the legal traditions of this country, and has struck at the
very concept of the fourth amendment. For if the amendment stands
for anything, it is that government must act with prudence and re
straint in moving against the individual, and then only upon just
cause.
The history of the fourth amendment demonstrates that the
standard of suspicion has never been considered an adequate or just
cause for government to intrude upon the individual's zone of pri
vacy by means of a warrant. Probable cause has always been the
standard under the warrant clause of the amendment by which pri
vacy is reasonably invaded. This command is central to the warrant
requirement, and represents the historical genesis of the fourth
amendment. To equate probable cause with suspicion is to stand
history on its head and to expose the individual and the privacies of
his life to the discretionary mercy of law enforcement officers.
The fact that this is being proposed in the name of effective law
enforcement and common sense is of no moment. The message
coming from Gates may have been sugarcoated and served up under
the least obnoxious banner of efficient law enforcement and practi
cality. But once Justice Rehnquist's opinion is stripped of its grace
ful style and palatable call for a more effective war on crime, what is
revealed is a message of bitter antagonism toward the warrant re
quirement, the standard of probable cause, and, above all else, the
fourth amendment itself. It is the duty of the states, as it befell them
once before prior to the establishment of the federal Constitution, to
resist this message of hate, and to preserve to their citizens what this
country fought in revolution to achieve: the dignity and privacy of
the individual, secure from arbitrary government.
As Henry v. United States 482 taught, and as Dunaway v. New
481.
482.

Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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York 483 confirmed, the requirement of probable cause "has roots
that are deep in our history."484 Those roots, however, have always
rejected any attempt to equate suspicion with probable cause. Thus,
history has revealed that "[h]ostility to [searches or] seizures based
on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the
[ijourth [a]mendment,"485 and decisions immediately after its adop
tion affirmed that "common rumor or report, suspicion, or even
'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for
arrest [or to search]. And that principle has survived to this day."486
The core principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence reveal a
deep-rooted commitment of this nation to a standard of probable
cause that is superior to the concept of suspicion. We, as a people,
had paid too high a price to rid ourselves of arbitrary government
and its inevitable excesses only to have then turned around and
adopted for ourselves a standard governing search-and-seizure prac
tices that would have effectively undercut the very principles that
gave birth to freedom in this country, and would have left the secur
ity and privacy of the individual at the mercy of petty officers of the
state. 487
Justice Rehnquist, as a member of the Supreme Court, had to
be familiar with this history, and was certainly charged with knowl
edge of the Court's pronouncements on this subject. Both Henry and
IJunaway have been and remain good law, and, he must have
known this when he authored the majority opinion in Gates. The
conclusion is inescapable that he intentionally introduced the con
cept of suspicion into probable cause analysis for the purpose of lay
ing the foundation for the eventual lowering of the standard of
probable cause. If he is successful in this, he will have effectively
diminished the right of the people to be secure in their persons and
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. The net result
will be to reduce the fourth amendment to a "form of words,"488 and
to render its protections as "secondary rights, to be relegated to a
deferred position. "489
The states should be no party to such an insidious attempt to
483. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
484. Henry, 361 U.S. at 100; accord, IJunaway, 442 U.S. at 213.
485. IJunaway, 442 U.S. at 213.
486. Henry, 361 U.S. at 101 (footnote omitted).
487. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389-92.
488. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes,
J.) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Mapp, 367
U.S. at 655.
489. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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undercut the principles that gave birth to this nation. The standard
of probable cause is no formality. It serves a high function and de
fines the criteria for the reasonable invasion of privacy. The stan
dard was selected not to shield criminals but to protect the innocent
from arbitrary intrusions by agents of the govequnent. The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to be subject to the dangers inher
ent in a standard governed by the principles of suspicion. Power has
a heady effect; and history has shown that the police, acting pursuant
to a standard of suspicion, cannot be trusted. Against such a perni
cious doctrine, a state court "should resolutely set its face."49o
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article ends where, in a very real sense, it began: with Boyd
v. United States,491 "[t]he leading case on the subject of search and
seizure,"492 and which ''will be remembered as long as civil liberty
lives in the United States."493 Writing nearly one hundred years
ago, Justice Bradley placed the courts of this nation under a charge
to protect fundamental rights in terms that proved to be prophetic:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their effi
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it con
sisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon. 494
It is submitted, in conclusion, that the state courts remain under
this charge, and should take up the call of Boyd "to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en
croachments thereon," by rejecting the message emanating from
Gates. Suspicion must never be the standard of probable cause, and
no warrant should issue on the basis of hearsay evidence contained
in an informant's tip without a substantial factual basis to support a
490.
491.
492.
380 U.S.
493.
494.

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147; accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
693, 696 (1965).
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
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reasonable inference that the informer is a credible person who has
obtained his information in a reliable way. To permit suspicion to
be the standard by which privacy may be invaded, or to sanction the
issuance of a warrant on less than a substantial factual basis to sup
port a reasonable inference that an informant is a credible person
who has gathered his information in a trustworthy manner, will re
sult in an evisceration of the probable cause standard and an impair
ment of the rights secured by the fourth amendment.

